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The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: 
A Cost–Benefit Approach to Incarceration 
David S. Abrams 
ABSTRACT: Depriving an individual of life or liberty is one of the most 
intrusive powers that governments wield. Decisions about imprisonment 
capture the public imagination. The stories are told daily in newspapers 
and on television, dramatized in literature and on film, and debated by 
scholars. The United States has created an ever-increasing amount of 
material for discussion as the state incarceration rate quadrupled between 
1980 and 2000. While the decision to incarcerate an individual is given 
focused attention by a judge, prosecutor, and (occasionally) a jury, the 
overall incarceration rate is not. 
 In this Article, I apply a cost–benefit approach to incarceration with the 
goal of informing public policy. An excessive rate of incarceration not only 
deprives individuals of freedom, but also costs the taxpayers large amounts 
of money. Too little imprisonment harms society in a different way—through 
costs to victims and even non-victims who must increase precautions to 
avoid crime. Striking the right balance of costs and benefits is what good 
law and public policy strive for. 
 Changes to the inmate population may be made in several different ways. 
One insight that I stress in this Article is that the precise form of a proposed 
incarceration policy change is crucial to properly evaluating the impact of 
the change. Therefore, I analyze several potential policy changes and their 
implications for sentencing and imprisonment. The calculations are 
informed by recent empirical work on the various ways in which 
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imprisonment impacts overall welfare. I find that the benefits of limited one-
time prisoner releases and the reclassification of some crimes exceed the costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 23, 2011, in Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld a ruling that California’s prisons were so overcrowded that they 
violated inmates’ Eighth Amendment protections.1 The state was ordered to 
reduce its prison population by about 35,000 inmates within two years,2 a 
number equivalent to the entire incarcerated populations of Switzerland, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, and Belgium combined.3 
Prior to the finding in Brown v. Plata, the California legislature had 
already passed a bill aimed at reducing incarceration in the state, due to 
both the pending litigation in the Supreme Court and the severe budgetary 
crisis.4 The situation in California is emblematic of the states as a whole, 
where existing incarceration policies and tight budgets have led to rampant 
overcrowding in prisons.5 After a two-decade period in which incarceration 
 
 1. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944–47 (2011) (upholding the ruling of a three-
judge panel, finding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the prison population 
“should be capped at 137.5% of design capacity”); see also PAUL GOLASZEWSKI, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE, A STATUS REPORT: REDUCING PRISON OVERCROWDING IN CALIFORNIA 3 & fig.1 
(2011) (estimating inmate population reductions in the following amounts in order to meet 
the rulings of the federal courts: 11,000 by December 27, 2011; 10,000 by June 27, 2012; 6000 
by December 27, 2012; and 8000 by June 27, 2013). 
 2. The ruling could technically be satisfied by building additional prisons to house the 
35,000 excess inmates. This possibility, however, is financially and politically infeasible, and 
thus discussion has focused largely on reduction of state prison inmates. See GOLASZEWSKI, supra 
note 1, at 7 (“[T]he federal court is not ordering the state at this time to implement specific 
measures to reduce overcrowding in its prisons. Rather, the court is providing the state with the 
flexibility to determine how best to limit the population in the prison system to 137.5 percent 
of design capacity within two years.”); id. at 5–6 (arguing that “little progress has been made 
on” plans to add additional prison capacity and that such plans are likely to “have little impact 
on the state’s ability to comply with the three-judge panel’s ruling in the next two years”). 
 3. See ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 
5–6 tbl.4 (8th ed. 2009). 
 4. SBX3 18, 2009–2010 Sess. (Cal. 2009) (enacted) (amending state law to increase the 
monetary threshold for classifying certain crimes as felonies, establish parole reentry courts, 
increase the credits that inmates could earn to reduce their in-prison sentence, and make 
ineligible for return to prison violations by certain non-serious, non-violent parolees). 
 5. See W. Wesley Johnson et al., Getting Tough on Prisoners: Results from the National 
Corrections Executive Survey, 1995, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 24, 25 (1997) (“According to the 
American Civil Liberties Union Status Report on state prisons, 33 jurisdictions were at that time 
under court order or consent decree because of overcrowding and/or conditions in specific 
prisons, and entire prison systems in 9 jurisdictions have been declared unconstitutional 
because of overcrowding and/or conditions. Only three states—Minnesota, New Jersey, and 
North Dakota—had never been under court order for prison overcrowding or conditions, 
although many of New Jersey’s jails that house state prisoners are under court order.” (citation 
omitted)); see also, e.g., Baker v. Holden, 787 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (D. Utah 1992) (holding that 
double celling of inmates would constitute “deliberate indifference” in certain circumstances 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1383–84 (S.D. Tex. 
1980) (holding that prisons in Texas were overcrowded, resulting in inadequate sanitation, 
recreational facilities, health care, hearing procedures for discipline, and access to courts), aff’d 
 
A1_ABRAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013  3:25 PM 
908 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:905 
rates nearly quadrupled,6 combined with the worst economic recession since 
the 1930s, many have begun to question whether the costs from 
incarcerating additional prisoners outweigh the benefits.7 This Article seeks 
to address that question from an empirical cost–benefit perspective. 
The purpose of a cost–benefit analysis is to attempt to aggregate all of 
the effects of changes in incarceration and measure them in a single unit: 
dollars.8 This allows the policymaker to concretely identify the expected 
impact of any policy change and consider how different policies might yield 
superior net benefits. While it may seem unusual to put a dollar value on 
things such as pain or fear from crime, this is exactly what judges and jurors 
do in calculating damages. The cost–benefit approach has been used 
successfully in numerous other fields9 (often with hard-to-quantify 
characteristics) but to this point has had limited application to incarceration 
and crime. 
Judge Richard Posner points out the need for careful empirical work on 
incarceration in a recent review of William Stuntz’s book The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice: 
It is apparent from this important book that the causality of crime 
and punishment is immensely complex. Intelligent reform will 
require an understanding of that causality, and such an 
understanding cannot be obtained without statistical analysis that 
measures the respective weights of all the conjectured causal 
 
in part, rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982); A Chronology of Major Events/Developments, 
S.C. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.sc.gov/about_scdc/AgencyHistory1.jsp (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012) (explaining that two class action lawsuits by inmates in South Carolina resulted 
in consent decrees that forced the state to reduce prison overcrowding). 
 6. See Key Facts at a Glance: Incarceration Rate, 1980–2009, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/incrttab.cfm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) 
(reporting the “[n]umber of sentenced inmates incarcerated under state or federal jurisdiction 
per 100,000 population” as 139 in 1980 and 478 in 2000). 
 7. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S 
PRISONS 2 (2011) [hereinafter PEW, REVOLVING DOOR], available at http://www.pewstates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/Pew_State_of_Recidivism.pdf (finding high rates of 
recidivism that “suggest that despite the massive increase in corrections spending . . . the system 
designed to deter [criminals] from continued criminal behavior clearly is falling short”); id. at 
19–23 (describing approaches, other than incarceration, taken by Oregon, Michigan, and 
Missouri to decrease recidivism). 
 8. I will discuss the limitations of this approach in Part II. 
 9. See, e.g., Carolyn Buxton Bridges et al., Effectiveness and Cost–Benefit of Influenza 
Vaccination of Healthy Working Adults: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 284 JAMA 1655, 1655–56 
(2000) (performing a cost–benefit analysis on administering influenza vaccines to healthy 
working adults); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost–Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943–44 (1999) (discussing issues in cost–
benefit analysis on environmental regulation). 
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factors. No one has done that, though Steven Levitt may have come 
closest. . . . The rigorous analysis of data is indispensable . . . .10 
This Article responds to this need and adds a new perspective to the 
legal scholarship on criminal law and punishment, the vast majority of which 
has been historical and normative in nature.11 The new approach is only 
possible due to recent advances in empirical methodology of the law and 
economics of crime. These advances are crucial in quantifying the 
components that enter into a cost–benefit analysis. These components 
include the response of crime to longer sentences (general deterrence), the 
salutary effect of incarceration (if any, known as specific deterrence), and 
the costs of crime, among others. 
Until recently, social scientists lacked the tools and data necessary to 
answer even some of the most basic questions about criminal behavior, such 
as “Do longer prison sentences deter crime?” While simple to pose, such 
questions present methodological difficulties for social scientists because 
they cannot perform randomized experiments (which in this case would 
require random law changes) to test the proposition directly. Beginning 
largely in the 1990s, economists began using several new methodologies, 
including natural experiments,12 instrumental variables (“IVs”),13 
differences-in-differences,14 and other approaches that allow for causal 
 
 10. Richard A. Posner, Incarceration Blues, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2011, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/books/magazine/96711/earl-warren-supreme-court-criminal-justice- 
system? (reviewing WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011)). 
 11. For the most recent examples of excellent work along these lines, see STEPHANOS 
BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012); PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? 
SEVENTEEN CASES THAT CHALLENGED THE LAW (1999); and STUNTZ, supra note 10. 
 12. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements To Distinguish 
Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343 (1999) (using sentence enhancements 
as a natural experiment to differentiate between the effects on crime rates from deterrence 
versus incapacitation); Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence 
from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319 (1996) (using prison overcrowding 
litigation as a natural experiment to explore the effect of prison population size on crime 
rates). 
 13. See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: 
AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 115 (2009) (“Undoubtedly . . . the most important contemporary 
use of [instrumental variable] methods is to solve the problem of omitted variables bias (OVB). 
[Instrumental variable] methods solve the problem of missing or unknown control variables, 
much as a randomized trial obviates extensive controls in a regression.”); David S. Abrams & 
Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 
49 ECON. INQUIRY 750, 760–61 (2011) (using instrumental variables to explore the effect of 
bail on pre-trial outcomes—release, re-arrest, and failure to appear). See generally Yair Listokin, 
Does More Crime Mean More Prisoners? An Instrumental Variables Approach, 46 J.L. & ECON. 181 
(2003) (using the abortion rate as an instrumental variable to estimate the elasticity of prison 
admissions with respect to crime). 
 14. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13, at 227 (“In some cases, group-level omitted 
variables can be captured by group-level fixed effects, an approach that leads to the differences-
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inference even when randomized experiments are unavailable.15 These 
techniques, along with the increased availability of large digitized datasets of 
criminal justice data, make a cost–benefit analysis of incarceration feasible 
for the first time.16 This is the first article to use sophisticated empirical 
estimates to arrive at precise valuations of specific policy changes, but builds 
on much important previous work. In so doing, this Article will hopefully be 
the first of a new type of analysis—a scientific analysis of crime and decision 
making about criminal justice. 
While these advances make a cost–benefit analysis possible, its 
application must be tied to specific policy changes. For example, two methods 
of reducing a prison population are by a one-time prisoner release and by 
decriminalizing certain low-level offenses. Each may result in the same net 
change in prisoners (the benefit), but the effect on crime rates (the cost) 
may be dramatically different. 
In this Article, I perform cost–benefit analyses for three types of policy 
changes. The first policy change is a marginal change in the average 
sentence length for all crimes. This change is not intended to be realistic but 
is the simplest way the methodology may be illustrated. It allows for some of 
the calculations utilized by the more realistic policy changes to be 
introduced in a simpler setting. The second policy change is similar but 
more realistic: a shift in allowable sentences for some crimes. This could 
include reclassifying some felonies as misdemeanors or certain parole 
violations as not triggering re-incarceration.17 The third policy change is a 
one-time release of a certain number of prisoners, chosen by the amount of 
time remaining on their sentences, type of crime, age, health, or a 
combination thereof. 
While crime reduction is certainly not the only purpose nor the only 
effect of incarceration, it is the benefit I focus on here. Retribution for 
wrongful acts is an important function for imprisonment and thus should be 
 
in-differences (DD) identification strategy.”). See generally David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur 
Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives To Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613 
(2009) (using a differences-in-differences framework to study the relationship of duration of 
intellectual property protection and quantity of innovation). 
 15. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13, at 221 (describing fixed effects, differences-in-
differences, and panel data as useful strategies when good instrumental variables cannot be 
found). 
 16. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear To Reduce Crime: Deterrence, 
Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998) (using data on reported 
crimes from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports to explore whether the negative relationship 
between arrest rates and crime is due to deterrence, incapacitation, or measurement error); 
Gary Sweeten & Robert Apel, Incapacitation: Revisiting an Old Question with a New Method and New 
Data, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 303 (2007) (using the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth to estimate crimes avoided by incapacitation). 
 17. This could also be made in the other direction, so the change in incarceration 
numbers need not be a decrease. 
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included in the cost–benefit calculation.18 Unfortunately, there are currently 
no good estimates of how much people value retribution, so it may be 
viewed as a factor that is omitted from the calculus. One may interpret the 
results of this study as providing an implicit bound on the value of 
retribution.19 
While the aim of this Article is to introduce a new approach to 
evaluating punishment, the analysis is limited to the issue of the proper 
extent of incarceration. It does not speak to the best way to allocate criminal 
justice resources more broadly, including policing, job training, drug 
programs, and a host of other alternatives to incarceration that may impact 
the prevalence of crime.20 However, as long as incarceration continues to be 
the dominant method of punishment for serious crime it is important to 
precisely examine its effects. 
My empirical analysis shows that when reductions in prison populations 
become necessary, one-time prisoner releases are generally more cost-
effective than crime reclassification. This is largely because one-time releases 
do not diminish general deterrence and release only the lowest-cost 
offenders. However, by assumption, one-time releases cannot be repeated 
and are thus not a general solution. Thus crime reclassification can still be a 
powerful tool in reducing the aggregate burden of crime and incarceration 
costs.  
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe potential 
policy changes in more detail and discuss the mechanisms through which 
these policy changes impact crime. Since the accuracy of the values used in 
the cost–benefit analysis is crucial to its validity, I go into some detail on the 
derivation of these values in Part II. This includes an explanation of the 
importance of causal inference, a discussion of the techniques used to 
approximate randomized experiments, and a summary of the key 
scholarship that makes use of these approaches. 
Part III introduces an analytical framework for performing the cost–
benefit analysis, based on the parameters identified in Part II. The model is 
then calibrated using these parameters, and I report quantitative predictions 
for each of the various policy changes. In Part IV, I discuss the implications 
of these results for current and future policy decisions. Part V concludes 
 
 18. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 11, at 119 (“Despite academic skepticism, popular morality 
is an enduring foundation for criminal justice. Descriptively, it is what drives criminal justice 
policy.”); Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1892 (2007) (finding people’s “shared intuitions of justice” may shape 
“criminal justice debates”). 
 19. For example, if the costs of the current incarceration level appear to exceed the 
benefits by $10 million, that could imply that the public values the current level of retribution 
at $10 million. 
 20. Some of these approaches may be more cost-effective than incarceration, but they are 
not considered here. 
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with a brief discussion of how this type of analysis and future extensions 
augment current approaches to the study of criminal justice. 
I. OVERVIEW OF POLICY CHANGES 
A. TYPES OF POLICY CHANGES 
In order to make concrete policy recommendations about 
incarceration, it is necessary to have specific policy changes in mind. With 
the substantial growth in the incarceration rate (Figure 1) and spending 
(Figure 2) over the past thirty years, a number of policies have recently been 
considered, each aimed at improving the cost–benefit ratio. In this Article, I 
use three general types of policy changes, which account for most recent 
changes in incarceration policy and many of those currently being 
contemplated—sentence length modification, revision of the eligibility 
requirements for crimes, and one-time release of prisoners. Each policy 
change implicates the costs and benefits of incarceration in different ways, 
which I detail below. 
 
FIGURE 1 
INCARCERATION RATE IN THE U.S., 1960–2009 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNIV. AT ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 
6.28.2009, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282009.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 
2012). 
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The key to correct implementation of the cost–benefit analysis is 
identifying the mechanisms through which each of these policy changes 
acts. I explore how each of the policy changes impacts five costs and benefits 
of incarceration: general deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, 
value of freedom, and prison costs.21 These five are the focus because they 
will be most affected by changes in incarceration and because they are 
readily measurable. In addition to these factors, there are a number of 
additional components that could impact the cost–benefit analysis that I will 
discuss later. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of the chosen policy 
changes. 
FIGURE 2 
CORRECTIONS SPENDING IN THE U.S., 1982–2007 
 
 
 
 
Source: TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND 
EMPLOYMENT, FY 1982–2007—STATISTICAL TABLES 6 tbl.5 (2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jee8207st.pdf.  
The first policy change is an increase or decrease of all sentences by a 
certain percentage, for example a proposal to increase all criminal sentences 
in a state by ten percent. This policy change is not realistic, and its purpose 
is to provide a simple point of comparison with the other, more realistic 
policy changes. The analysis of this proposed change can give insight into 
more realistic proposals where sentences may change according to offense 
 
 21. The value of freedom incorporates the loss not only to the inmate, but also to relatives 
and friends. It also incorporates foregone wages. See infra Part II.E.2. 
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type or offender criminal history. The complication of adding variation to 
each of the components of the cost–benefit calculation may then be invoked 
to examine other policy changes. 
The second type of policy change is one that reclassifies some crimes so 
that they either gain or lose eligibility for incarceration. An increase in the 
minimum threshold that delineates felony larceny from $500 to $1000 (in a 
jurisdiction where misdemeanors may not be punished by incarceration) is 
an example of such a change. This decreased penalty for thefts of property 
valued between $500 and $1000 leads to a lower prison population.22 
Another common policy change of this type deals with “technical 
violations”—infractions that lead to a revocation of parole but which are not 
otherwise crimes. Some states have recently changed rules so that failure of a 
single drug test while on parole does not trigger automatic incarceration.23 
 
 22. See, e.g., GOLASZEWSKI, supra note 1, at 4 (describing how California amended state law 
to “increase the dollar threshold for certain property crimes to be considered a felony, thus 
making fewer offenders eligible for prison”); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ARKANSAS’S 2011 PUBLIC 
SAFETY REFORM: LEGISLATION TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM AND CURTAIL PRISON GROWTH 11 (2011) 
[hereinafter PEW, ARKANSAS], available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/pew/ARhandout 
Aug2011.pdf (explaining that the Public Safety Improvement Act passed in Arkansas 
“[r]aise[d] the threshold for felony theft from $500 to $1,000 to reduce the number of felony 
convictions for low-level offenders”); see also ACLU, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES 
REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 18 (2011), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf (stating that Texas 
“[e]liminated prison sentences for juvenile misdemeanors”); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, SOUTH 
CAROLINA’S PUBLIC SAFETY REFORM: LEGISLATION ENACTS RESEARCH-BASED STRATEGIES TO CUT 
PRISON GROWTH AND COSTS 6 (2010) [hereinafter PEW, SOUTH CAROLINA], available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/ 
PSPP_South_Carolina_brief.pdf (explaining that South Carolina’s Omnibus Crime Reduction 
and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010 “[i]ncreas[ed] the property value threshold from $1,000 
to $2,000 for all felony property crimes, making all property crimes below $2,000 
misdemeanors”). 
 23. See, e.g., GOLASZEWSKI, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that, in order to reduce 
overcrowding, California enacted legislation to “make ineligible for revocation to prison 
violations by certain parolees with no serious, violent, or sex offenses”); PEW, REVOLVING DOOR, 
supra note 7, at 23 (“Today released offenders in Missouri are subject to ‘e-driven supervision’ 
(the ‘e’ is for evidence), which uses a new risk assessment tool to categorize parolees and help 
set supervision levels. When violations occur, officers have a range of sanctions they may 
impose, from a verbal reprimand or modification of conditions, to electronic monitoring, 
residential drug treatment or ‘shock time’ in jail.”); Patrick McGreevy, California Launches Plan 
To Cut Prison Population, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/ 
26/local/la-me-prisons26-2010jan26 (describing a recent change in California law, where 
inmates “will no longer be returned to prison for technical violations such as alcohol use, 
missed drug tests or failure to notify the state of an address change”); Michael D. White et al., 
Halfway Back: An Alternative to Revocation for Technical Parole Violators 11–12 (Jan. 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cecintl.com/pdf/research/Halfway% 
20Back%20paper%20for%20CJPR.pdf (describing Kentucky’s “Halfway Back” program, “an 
alternative to incarceration for offenders who have non-violent technical violations which would 
normally trigger revocation proceedings” (quoting David P. Munden et al., Intermediate Sanctions 
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An additional type of policy change that falls within this category, but would 
lead to a larger prison population, is the addition of new substances to the 
category of illegal drugs.24 The third type of policy change is a one-time 
release of prisoners. Unlike the previous two categories, this change only 
works in one direction: it decreases the incarcerated population. This has 
been a policy change that has been used in the past, albeit reluctantly, as a 
response to prison overcrowding.25 For example, Alabama released 1100 
prisoners in 1981 following a court order.26 
The impact of a prisoner release will vary substantially depending on 
which prisoners are chosen for release. Some of the most common groups 
include those with minimal time remaining on their sentences, elderly or 
medically infirm prisoners, or those convicted only of relatively minor 
crimes.27 Inmates with minimal time remaining on their sentences are more 
 
and the Halfway Back Program in Kentucky, 9 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 431, 437 (1998)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 24. Drugs are not considered in this Article because of lack of good data on the cost of 
drug crimes. 
 25. See, e.g., Valerie Olander, Overcrowded County Jail Releases Some Prisoners, DETROIT NEWS, 
Aug. 20, 2009, at 6A (describing the release of fifteen nonviolent inmates from a Michigan jail 
due to overcrowding); Peter Applebome, Texas, in Emergency, To Free 185 from Crowded Prisons, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/28/us/texas-in-emergency-to-
free-185-from-crowded-prisons.html (describing the release of about 185 Texas inmates due to 
a federal court order to remedy prison overcrowding); Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Ruiz v. 
Estelle (1980), TEX. POL., http://www.laits.utexas.edu/txp_media/html/just/features/0505_ 
01/ruiz.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (describing that Texas first responded to a court order 
to reduce prison overcrowding by expanding early release programs through parole or 
probation); Melissa MacBride & Rob McMillan, 150 IE Inmates To Be Free Due to Realignment, 
ABC LOCAL, KABC (Dec. 9, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/local/ 
inland_empire&id=8461125 (describing the release of 150 prisoners from a California jail due 
to overcrowding); John T. McQuiston, 50 Ordered Released from Overcrowded Jail in Jersey, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/05/nyregion/50-ordered-released-
from-overcrowded-jail-in-jersey.html (describing the release of fifty individuals “awaiting trial or 
grand-jury appearances” from a county jail in New Jersey due to overcrowding). 
 26. Wendell Rawls Jr., Powell Lifts Alabama Stay and 222 Prisoners Go Free, N.Y. TIMES (July 
26, 1981), http://nytimes.com/1981/07/26/us/powell-lifts-alabama-stay-and-222-prisoners-
go-free.html (“About four months ago, Mr. Graddick severely criticized the state’s Pardons and 
Paroles Board after it released about 1,100 prisoners and handed over a convicted murderer to 
Georgia prison officials so he could be imprisoned on another charge in that state.”). 
 27. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 22, at 21 (noting that Texas created a medical parole 
program to permit the “release of mentally or terminally ill prisoners to supervision in a 
medical facility”); id. at 58–59 (describing legislation enacting elderly parole eligibility in 
Wisconsin, Louisiana, and Ohio); PEW, ARKANSAS, supra note 22, at 11 (explaining that 
Arkansas passed legislation “to allow inmates diagnosed by two doctors, one not affiliated with 
the Department of Correction, as having a terminal illness and a life expectancy of two years or 
less or as permanently incapacitated and posing no threat to public safety to be paroled with an 
approved transfer plan”); PEW, SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 22, at 8 (explaining that South 
Carolina passed legislation to “[a]llow[] parole for an inmate who is terminally ill, geriatric or 
permanently incapacitated upon the petition of the Department of Corrections”). 
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likely to have been convicted of relatively minor crimes, which may decrease 
the likelihood of, or harm caused by, recidivism.28 However, they will also be 
younger than prisoners released based on age. Age-based release is 
sometimes the preferred policy because of the well-known relationship 
between criminality and age: crime is a young-man’s game.29 In all known 
cases of prisoner releases, those released are highly non-representative of 
the criminal population. Prisoners chosen to be released early are chosen 
because there is a lower likelihood of recidivism and a lower likelihood that 
they will commit particularly costly crimes if released. 
B. MECHANISMS BY WHICH INCARCERATION IMPACTS CRIME 
In order to understand the relative merits of these different policy 
changes it is important to understand their consequences, in particular their 
impact on crime rates. Changes in sentencing policies can impact crime 
primarily in three ways: general deterrence, specific deterrence, and 
incapacitation. Each policy will act through more than one of these 
mechanisms, but the effect depends on the exact policy change. 
General deterrence is the reduction in crime that occurs due to the 
expectation of punishment; longer sentences yield lower crime rates.30 An 
individual need not experience punishment in order to be generally 
deterred: A would-be thief may contemplate stealing a television but decide 
not to commit the crime for fear of being caught, prosecuted, and punished. 
Of course, the decision to commit crime will generally not be a conscious 
and explicit weighing of costs and benefits, just as the purchase of a candy 
bar does not usually involve an explicit quantification of the benefits and 
costs. But individuals do tend to buy less candy when the price rises and steal 
fewer televisions when the penalty increases.31 
 
 28. At any given time, some proportion of inmates serving lengthy sentences will also be 
within a short period of release, but they are much less likely to be members of the pool of 
inmates within, for example, three months of release. To be concrete: compare an inmate 
serving a twenty-five year sentence for murder with one serving a one year sentence for 
manslaughter. The former will be within three months of release for only one percent of his 
sentence, while twenty-five percent of the latter’s prison term will come when he is at least this 
close to the end of his sentence. 
 29. See Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. 
SOC. 552, 556–61 (1983) (displaying age distributions that demonstrate that criminal 
propensity tends to peak in the late-teens). 
 30. See David S. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing 
Enhancements, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Oct. 2012, at 32. 
 31. Economists call this “as-if” modeling: individuals behave as if they go through 
sometimes complicated calculations, but in fact the cognitive process is often nearly 
instantaneous and not nearly as explicit as economists’ equations. See Alan James MacFadyen, 
Beliefs in Behavioral and Neoclassical Economics, in HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS: FOUNDATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 183, 194–95 (Morris Altman ed., 2006). 
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Specific deterrence, unlike general deterrence, only impacts offenders 
who have been caught, convicted, and incarcerated. Specific deterrence is 
the impact that the experience of incarceration has on subsequent 
offending.32 The name implies that it should have a negative effect on 
recidivism, but there are theories that predict that lengthier incarceration 
could breed greater recidivism rates. The most prominent such theory is 
that of “criminal capital formation,” the notion that inmates learn skills from 
their peers while incarcerated that make them more productive and active 
criminals upon release.33 Any empirical estimate of specific deterrence will 
not be able to separate this effect from the original notion that the longer 
one is imprisoned, the less likely he will be to recidivate when released. 
Thus, as I use the term in this Article, specific deterrence captures the 
aggregate effect of the experience of incarceration on subsequent 
offending. 
Incapacitation is the simplest of the mechanisms by which incarceration 
impacts crime. The physical separation of inmates from the general 
population precludes those inmates from committing crime on the public.34 
The magnitude of the incapacitation effect is simply the number of crimes 
that would have been committed had an individual not been incarcerated. 
This number should account for any replacement effect, whereby some of the 
crimes that an inmate would have committed are committed by a non-
incarcerated individual.35 
Thousands of papers have been written on the three aforementioned 
subjects, including many attempts to empirically estimate the magnitude of 
the various effects. In order to perform the cost–benefit analysis of the policy 
changes, it is necessary to have accurate values for the impact of general 
deterrence, specific deterrence, and incapacitation on crime. This is no easy 
feat. In the next Part, I discuss why obtaining causal estimates is so difficult 
in the social sciences and what advances have been made recently in doing 
so. I then detail some of my own work as well as several other recent studies 
that use these techniques to obtain substantially more precise estimates of 
these crime-affecting mechanisms than have previously been produced. 
These estimates are then used to perform the cost–benefit calculations. 
 
 32. David S. Abrams, Building Criminal Capital vs. Specific Deterrence: The Effect of 
Incarceration Length on Recidivism 2 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/dabrams/workingpapers/AbramsRecidivism.pdf. 
 33. See generally Patrick Bayer, Randi Hjalmarsson & David Pozen, Building Criminal Capital 
Behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections, 124 Q.J. ECON. 105 (2009). 
 34. This, of course, does not mean that no crime occurs within prison. I discuss the 
challenges of incorporating costs of this type later in the Article. See infra Part II.C. 
 35. This effect seems particularly likely to be important with drug crimes, where 
incarcerating one dealer may just expand another dealer’s territory. 
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II. CAUSAL INFERENCE AND THE INPUTS TO COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
As I discuss some of the key empirical works on crime in the pages that 
follow, causal inference will be a unifying concept. The goal of much social 
science research is to identify the causal impact of A on B; for example, the 
impact of a legal education on earnings or the effect of race on sentencing. 
The best way to approach these questions is with a randomized experiment. 
This helps avoid common impediments to causal inference. For example, a 
simple comparison of the earnings of lawyers and non-lawyers could be 
explained not by the impact of a legal education, but rather by differences 
in the type of person who chooses to become a lawyer.36 
One may attempt to control for these differences by comparing 
individuals who are otherwise similar (e.g., similar educational background, 
age, income, etc.) and differ only in their exposure to a legal education. 
While controlling for these types of observable characteristics, in virtually all 
cases, there will be unobservable characteristics that one cannot control for. In 
this example, important unobservable characteristics may include 
motivation, drive, character, relatives who are attorneys, interest in legal 
questions, etc. 
It may seem logical that a study controlling for observable 
characteristics but ignoring unobservable characteristics would still get 
pretty close to the correct answer. While this seems sensible, it turns out to 
be completely wrong. In a groundbreaking paper published in 1986, Robert 
LaLonde showed that even when controlling for all observables one may not 
only get the size of the effect wrong, one may not even get the sign correct.37 In 
this example, that means that one might conclude that law school increases 
earnings, when in fact the opposite is true. 
LaLonde showed this surprising result by analyzing data from a 
temporary employment program aimed at increasing subsequent earnings. 
Unlike most such programs, this one was easy to evaluate because those 
chosen to participate were drawn at random from all eligible applicants to 
the program—a true randomized experiment. Normally, to assess the 
program’s impact, one would simply compare the subsequent earnings of 
those who received the training (the treatment group) with those who did 
not (the controls). 
LaLonde’s insight was to perform the analysis in two ways. In addition 
to the traditional approach just mentioned, he also analyzed the data as 
though it were not a randomized experiment, and individuals could choose 
in a non-random way whether to be in the treatment group, much as people 
 
 36. This is known as a selection effect. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13, at 12–15.  
 37. Robert J. LaLonde, Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs with 
Experimental Data, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 604, 616 & tbl.6, 617 (1986). 
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choose (non-randomly, one hopes) whether to attend law school.38 He then 
attempted to control for the observable characteristics of those individuals 
to estimate the impact of the training program in the standard non-
experimental method of analysis.39 He found that the estimated effect of the 
program from the non-experimental analysis was not only a different 
magnitude as the (correct) experimental analysis indicated, it was a different 
sign!40 The experimental analysis showed that the program increased 
subsequent earnings of workers, while the non-experimental analysis 
implied that it decreased their earnings.41 
LaLonde’s paper—and a number that have been written since42—began 
a revolution in empirical economics.43 The work clarified the importance of 
using randomized experiments to answer questions in the social sciences—
carefully using control variables is not enough. So how would one answer 
the question about the impact of legal education on earnings? Here is an 
example in which one could hypothetically perform the desired randomized 
experiment: take a group of law school applicants just on the cusp of being 
admitted and randomly select half for admission.44 A comparison of 
subsequent earnings would answer the question that was initially posed with 
no need for any complicated analysis or extensive control variables. This is 
the beauty and simplicity of the randomized experiment. 
While the emphasis on the randomized experiment has had a profound 
impact on economic research, for most questions of interest, especially in 
the domains of law and crime, it is impossible or unrealistic to perform a 
randomized experiment. For example, the second question posed above—
the impact of race on criminal sentencing—would seem to require that race 
be randomly assigned, a concept that seems inherently difficult.45 Even the 
 
 38. Id. at 615–17. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 617 (“[T]he nonexperimental procedures produce estimates that are usually 
positive and larger than the experimental results for the female participants, and are negative 
and smaller than the experimental estimates for the male participants.”). 
 41. Id. at 616 tbl.6. 
 42. See, e.g., Rajeev H. Dehejia & Sadek Wahba, Propensity Score-Matching Methods for 
Nonexperimental Causal Studies, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 151 (2002); Rajeev H. Dehejia, Was There 
a Riverside Miracle? A Hierarchical Framework for Evaluating Programs with Grouped Data, 21 J. BUS. & 
ECON. STAT. 1 (2003); Robert J. LaLonde & Rosa M. Cho, The Impact of Incarceration in State 
Prison on the Employment Prospects of Women, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 243 (2008). 
 43. Though Steve Levitt has become the most public face of this style of economic 
research, it also includes a large fraction of economic empiricists trained in the past fifteen 
years. 
 44. For purposes of this hypothetical, assume there is only one law school that they wish to 
attend. 
 45. The closest any recent research on the topic has come is a field experiment where 
résumés were mailed to employers and the name of the applicant was randomly assigned to be 
black or white sounding. Résumés with black-sounding names resulted in substantially fewer job 
 
A1_ABRAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013  3:25 PM 
920 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:905 
legal education experiment is one that would be unlikely to pass muster with 
most Institutional Review Boards or law school deans. 
Thus, for most real-world questions, researchers use proxies for the 
ideal randomized experiments they would perform in an idealized world. 
The quasi-experimental techniques employed include instrumental 
variables, regression discontinuity, natural experiments, difference-in-
difference, and other approaches.46 Together, over the past decade, the 
application of these techniques has substantially advanced our 
understanding of the various mechanisms by which incarceration affects 
crime. I now discuss some of the most important studies in several areas and 
explain how their use of quasi-experimental techniques has advanced the 
field to the point where an initial utilitarian calculus is now realistic. I then 
use the results of these studies to implement the cost–benefit calculation in 
the section that follows. 
A. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF GENERAL DETERRENCE 
1. Background 
Incarceration (and other penalties) can reduce crime simply by its 
threatened use. This effect is called general deterrence, and it has the 
advantage of potentially reducing crime without increasing costs at all (or 
even reducing them)—because crime reduction due to longer sentences is 
concomitant with a reduction (although an increase in duration) of 
incarcerated individuals.47 There has been and continues to be much debate 
among economists and criminologists about the magnitude and even 
existence of general deterrence. In order to evaluate the impact of a change 
in incarceration policy, it is crucial to have a good estimate of the deterrent 
effect. I report some of the most recent findings from my own work and 
from the work of others which typically find a non-zero, but relatively small, 
general deterrent effect. 
There has been a great deal of research on general deterrence over the 
past several decades, but until recently there was no consensus as to the 
 
interviews. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 
997–98 (2004). 
 46. These techniques are described below, in conjunction with the papers that employ 
them. 
 47. Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence, 30 
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 123, 123 (1993) (“[Daniel] Nagin (1978) defines general deterrence 
as the ‘imposition of sanctions on one person [in order to] demonstrate to the rest of the 
public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby discourage criminal behavior in the 
general population.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence: 
A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS 
OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 95, 96 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978))). 
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existence and magnitude of a deterrent effect.48 In the past fifteen years, 
greater attention has been paid to careful identification, as well as separating 
deterrence and incapacitation effects.49 
As illustrated in the previous Subpart, most convincing research on 
general deterrence will employ a technique that approximates the ideal 
experiment that one would run if one could. In this case, that experiment 
would involve a randomly assigned sentence—for example, a sentence 
adopted by two states that are otherwise identical. Absent random variation, 
one would not be able to distinguish a correlation between sentence length 
 
 48. Nagin finds evidence for an overall deterrent effect in the criminal justice system, but 
believes more work is needed to better establish that increased sentences deter crime. Daniel S. 
Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 36–
37 (1998). In a 2003 article, Anthony N. Doob and Cheryl Marie Webster review a handful of 
papers by economists and a large number by criminologists and conclude that the lack of 
strong evidence for deterrence supports the proposition that there is a null effect. Anthony N. 
Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME 
& JUST. 143, 189 (2003). These authors along with Franklin E. Zimring pay particular attention 
to Daniel Kessler and Steven D. Levitt’s 1999 paper, which they do not finding convincing. 
Cheryl Marie Webster, Anthony N. Doob & Franklin E. Zimring, Proposition 8 and Crime Rates in 
California: The Case of the Disappearing Deterrent, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 417, 417 (2006) 
(“In particular, the addition of annual crime levels for all years (versus only the odd-numbered 
years that Kessler and Levitt examine) calls into question the prima facie support for a 
deterrent effect presented by Kessler and Levitt.”); see also Doob & Webster, supra, at 166 
(critiquing Kessler and Levitt’s 1999 paper, finding, for example, that there was a “risk of 
contamination by incapacitation effects” and that the analysis “of only odd-numbered years still 
remains a mystery”). In a 2004 article, Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley take a more 
nuanced view that there are circumstances where increased sentences may deter, although they 
argue that the magnitude is insufficient to influence policy decisions. Paul H. Robinson & John 
M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
173, 205 (2004). In the Handbook of Law and Economics, Levitt and Thomas J. Miles discuss 
several economic studies that find evidence for general deterrence, but conclude that more 
research on the topic is necessary. Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical Study of Criminal 
Punishment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 455, 488–89 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., 2007). Isaac Ehrlich, in a 1981 article, performed some of the most 
publicized empirical work on deterrence by an economist and focused to a great extent on 
murder. Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of 
Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 319 (1981) (“[I]n a large 
class of cases, efficient crime control requires only the imposition of deterring punishments or 
the promotion of general legitimate earning opportunities, without any attempt at individual 
control.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, The Deterrent Effects of 
Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 117 J. POL. ECON. 257, 258–60 (2009) (using a natural 
experiment in Italy to corroborate a general deterrence theory, finding that an extra month in 
expected sentence reduces the likelihood to recommit a crime by 1.3%); Eric Helland & 
Alexander Tabarrok, Does Three Strikes Deter? A Nonparametric Estimation, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 
309, 315–17 (2007) (finding that California’s three-strikes law has a deterrent effect and 
reduces third-strike arrests by 17–20%); Levitt, supra note 16, at 360–70 (finding deterrence to 
be a more important factor than incapacitation in explaining “the negative correlation between 
arrest rates and crime”). 
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and crime (perhaps because states with longer sentences have higher crime 
rates to begin with) from a causal impact of sentence length. 
Earlier, I discussed how determining the impact of law school on 
earnings would require us to randomly select for admission and rejection 
among a group of applicants on the cusp of admission. This discontinuity in 
outcome among presumably similar applicants is key to distinguishing 
between causation and mere correlation. Quantifying the general deterrent 
effect of a policy is even more difficult because one not only needs to 
discern causation but also distinguish between the impact of the policy 
through general deterrence from the impact of the policy through 
incapacitation. Several recent studies take pains to distinguish these effects, 
using California ballot measures,50 changes in sentence length at the age of 
majority,51 and a natural experiment in Italian prisons.52 
One technique that has been commonly used in measuring the impact 
of general deterrence is known as “regression discontinuity.” One example 
of this technique is attempting to determine the general deterrent effect of 
sentence length by looking at changes in crime rates at the age of majority. 
Since sentence lengths vary discontinuously at this age, one would expect 
crime rates to drop discontinuously. This should be true, even though there 
is a general trend in criminality with age. But because that trend should be 
smooth (that is, there is no reason to expect that one’s criminal propensity 
drops or rises sharply from one day or week to the next), by focusing on a 
short period just before and after the age of majority, one should only detect 
the impact of the change in sentence length on crime.53 
2. Recent Literature 
David S. Lee and Justin McCrary apply this approach in a 2009 article to 
estimate general deterrence using a large data set of high-frequency data 
from Florida.54 They find a drop in crime of two percent around this 
discontinuity and suggest that part of the low response might be due to 
“myopic behavior.”55 Levitt’s 1998 article uses cross-state differences in the 
relative harshness of adult sanctions versus juvenile sanctions.56 He finds that 
those states with larger jumps in punishment have larger decreases in adult 
 
 50. See generally Webster, Doob & Zimring, supra note 48. 
 51. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and 
Evidence (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 189, 2009), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/189lee.pdf. 
 52. See generally Drago, Galbiati & Vertova, supra note 49. 
 53. This technique is widely used in economics. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13. 
 54. Lee & McCrary, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
 55. Id. at 32–33. 
 56. See Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156 (1998). 
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crime compared to juvenile crime.57 In a 2009 article, Randi Hjalmarsson 
examines offender perceptions of penalties and finds that they vary much 
less than actual changes at the age of majority.58 She finds little evidence of 
deterrence in self-reported data.59 
Differences-in-differences is another widely used technique in empirical 
economics that may also be used to obtain careful estimates of general 
deterrence.60 The first “difference” in this technique is often a law change. 
For example, in Kessler and Levitt’s 1999 paper, they use a change in 
sentence lengths in California.61 Many studies simply compare crime rates 
after such a law change relative to before the law change and ascribe any 
difference to the causal effect of the law. This can be problematic if there 
are overall trends—such as a national economic downturn—that also affect 
crime. The solution is to use a second “difference,” often another state, as a 
control group to account for these overall trends. As long as the larger 
trends affect both states similarly, this effect will be “differenced out” and 
the remaining effect will be the law change of interest. Triple difference is 
just an extension of differences-in-differences, where a third dimension is 
used to allow for more complicated overall variation.62 
In their 1999 article Kessler and Levitt use changes due to the passage 
of Proposition 8 in California in 1982, which provided for sentence 
enhancements for a particular set of crimes.63 The authors use a differences-
in-differences and triple-difference approach, using variation by time, state, 
and type of crime to isolate the effect of the California law change. They 
separate deterrence from incapacitation by examining changes in short-term 
crime rates for serious offenses with lengthy, underlying sentences and find 
the mean three-year deterrent effect to be eight percent.64 
 
 57. Id. at 1156 (finding that “changes in relative punishments can account for 60 percent” 
of the differential growth rates in juvenile and adult violent crime between 1978 and 1993). 
 58. Randi Hjalmarsson, Crime and Expected Punishment: Changes in Perceptions at the Age of 
Criminal Majority, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 209, 231–33 (2009) (“[C]onsistent with the objective 
data, there is evidence of a jump in the perceived chance of jail at the age of criminal majority. 
However, the size of the jump is perceived to be smaller than that which is measured in the 
various types of objective data.”). 
 59. Id. at 245 (“The analysis also finds little evidence of a discontinuous change in 
delinquent behavior, over and above general aging trends, at the age of criminal majority. 
Significant evidence of deterrence is only consistently seen when considering thefts of less than 
$50.”). 
 60. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13. 
 61. Kessler & Levitt, supra note 12, at 343. 
 62. To be precise, triple difference allows for overall variation, such as national trends that 
may vary in their effect across states. 
 63. See Kessler & Levitt, supra note 12, at 352–59. 
 64. Id. at 343 (“Proposition 8 appears to reduce eligible crimes by 4 percent in the year 
following its passage and 8 percent 3 years after passage.”). I elaborate on their method of 
separating deterrence from incapacitation below. 
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Another paper close in subject matter to that described in Part II.A.3 
below is that of Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody in which they 
examine the effect of gun laws on a range of outcomes.65 Using a data set on 
firearm-sentencing enhancements, prison population, and crime, the 
authors find little evidence that firearm-sentencing enhancements have an 
impact on either deterrence or incapacitation.66 
In recent work, I treat the passage of “add-on gun laws” by different 
states as a repeated “natural experiment” to estimate general deterrence.67 
Economists use the term “natural experiment” to denote any event that is 
not predictable and causes a heterogeneous effect.68 Many law changes 
qualify as natural experiments if their implementation is relatively rapid and 
their passage uncertain. For example, if a state legislature were to enact a 
hotly contested bill that would raise toll road rates immediately, this law 
change could serve as a useful way to estimate the value of using a toll road 
to drivers (by examining the change in number of vehicles per day after its 
passage). Lotteries can be extremely useful natural experiments, such as the 
Vietnam Draft Lottery which was used to estimate the effect of military 
service on subsequent earnings.69 In a 1990 article, Joshua D. Angrist 
compares the earnings of men whose draft numbers were selected with those 
that were not and found that military service decreased earnings by about 
fifteen percent.70 
3. Using Add-On Gun Laws To Estimate General Deterrence 
Add-on gun laws result in enhanced sentences for defendants convicted 
of possessing a firearm while committing a crime. These laws grew popular 
in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, with approximately thirty states 
adopting one of these laws by 1996.71 The key to distinguishing deterrence 
from incapacitation is the fact that add-on laws apply only to defendants who 
would otherwise receive sentences of incarceration. Thus, the short-term 
impact of an add-on gun law should be purely deterrent. 
 
 65. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Impact of Enhanced Prison Terms for Felonies 
Committed with Guns, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 247, 247 (1995) (estimating the impact of mandatory- 
minimum laws and sentence enhancements on “state prison populations, prison admissions, 
UCR crime rates, and gun use in homicides, assaults and robberies”). 
 66. Id. (finding little evidence that mandatory-minimum-sentencing laws and sentence 
enhancements reduced crime or increased prison populations). 
 67. See generally David S. Abrams, supra note 30. 
 68. ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13, at 7–8. 
 69. Joshua D. Angrist, Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social 
Security Administrative Records, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 313, 313–14 (1990). 
 70. Id. at 314. 
 71. See Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for 1970–99, 
in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 345, 39295 (Jens Ludwig & 
Philip J. Cook eds., 2003). 
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Consider the change in the gun robbery rate between the month before 
and the month after an add-on gun law goes into effect in a jurisdiction 
where robbery carries a sentence of six years and the add-on is two years. 
After the law change, criminals convicted of gun robbery will now receive 
sentences lasting eight years, rather than six. If there is no deterrent effect of 
the add-on law, there will be no difference in the number of defendants 
newly incarcerated the month before the introduction of the add-on law and 
the month after. If there is a change in the number of gun robberies in the 
month after the law’s introduction, it cannot be due to a change in 
incapacitation, and the change may be attributed to the deterrent effect of 
the increased sentence length. 
Several characteristics of add-on gun laws make them ideal for isolating 
the deterrent effect of incarceration. First, add-on laws were adopted in 
many different states, yielding many separate experiments to the analysis. 
Thus, I am able to expand on previous studies of deterrence,72 which usually 
focus on a single state.73 Second, the laws are generally only applied in cases 
where the underlying crime would merit a sentence of at least several years. 
This allows a good amount of time to detect the deterrent effect. Finally, 
add-on laws were adopted over a long time period (over forty years), during 
which there was substantial variation in crime rates. The temporal and cross-
sectional variation in the adoption of add-on laws makes it possible to 
control for time trends and state fixed effects. 
In order to measure the deterrent effect of add-on gun laws, it was 
necessary to hand-clean data from the Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR ”)74 and 
collect data from state legislative histories on add-on gun laws as well as from 
published sources. The main empirical results are from a regression of the 
reported gun robberies rate on a dummy variable indicating that the add-on 
law had passed.75 Essentially, the analysis is aggregating the data from all 
states that passed an add-on gun law and redefining the timing so that time 
zero in each state is when the law was passed (Figure 3). For example, if the 
law was passed in 1976 in Michigan and 1995 in North Carolina, year zero is 
1976 in Michigan and 1995 in North Carolina. Table 1 reproduces these 
results, with each column representing a separate regression.76 
 
 72. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 30. 
 73. See, e.g., Kessler & Levitt, supra note 12 (examining deterrent effect of sentence 
enhancements in California); Colin Loftin & David McDowall, The Deterrent Effects of the Florida 
Felony Firearm Law, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250 (1984). 
 74. The UCR is the most comprehensive collection of U.S. crime data, assembled annually 
by the FBI from over 17,000 local jurisdictions. Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr (last visited Nov. 21, 2012). 
 75. See Abrams, supra note 30. 
 76. The log specification is preferred because it counts equivalent relative declines in per 
capita gun robberies equally. “Balanced panel” indicates that data points were included only if 
they were within seven years prior to, or six years after, the effective date for an add-on law. This 
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Across specifications there appears to be a consistent finding that gun 
robbery rates decline after add-on gun laws go into effect. The impact is 
insignificant in the first year but is statistically significant at the 1% level 
after two or three years.77 The coefficients in Table 1 provide an estimate of 
the magnitude of the impact of the laws. Although the coefficients vary 
somewhat across specifications, there is a decline of 5–18% within the first 
three years of introduction of the law. In the preferred specification 
(column 8), which is the most conservative,78 there is an impact which seems 
to level off to 6% within two years, and 5% within three years. Note that the 
addition of state-specific time trends does not affect the coefficient 
substantially. This provides some support for the notion that the timing of 
add-on gun laws is random. 
In order to gain more information on the timing of the impact of the 
law change, I also estimate a regression of log per-capita gun robberies on 
dummy variables for year relative to the date of passage of the law change in 
a particular state.79 The results, reported in Figure 3, support the findings 
discussed above. Gun robbery rates, both with and without controlling for 
state trends, are fairly stable in the years preceding implementation of an 
add-on gun law, then decline for approximately two years, and then level 
out. 
  
 
is the maximum range of data that is available for all states that passed add-on laws. In half of 
the specifications, the data is restricted to years after 1974 due to a discontinuity in several 
variables in a large number of agencies in 1975 in the UCR data. All errors reported allow for 
intra-state correlation and are weighted by state population. All specifications included state 
and year effects, and the controls for poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial composition, age 
composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population. 
 77. This means there is less than a 1% likelihood that a result of size was found by chance. 
 78. This specification includes a balanced panel restricted to post-1974 data and with 
state-specific time trends. Panel data includes the same units observed at different points in 
time; for example, a panel data set may have annual data on individuals. However, there may 
not be an observation for every person in every year. For instance, in a panel, Person 1 may be 
represented for Years 1 to 5, Person 2 may be represented for Years 3 to 5, and Person 3 may be 
represented for Year 5 only. Balanced-panel data, on the other hand, would feature only those 
people with corresponding data in all of the years within the designated time period. For 
instance, using the previous example, a balanced panel for Years 3 to 5 would only feature 
Person 1 and Person 2, but not Person 3, who does not have data available for the full time 
period. Unbalanced panels will give more weight to states with no missing data, a problem that 
can be solved by restricting to a balanced panel. 
 79. See Abrams, supra note 30, at 43–44. 
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All regressions control for state and year fixed effects. For details, see tables.
FIGURE 3 
GUN ROBBERY RATE RELATIVE TO ADD-ON GUN LAW EFFECTIVE DATE 
 
The evidence from UCR data on gun robberies supports the notion that 
criminals are deterred by the implementation of add-on gun laws. There are 
a number of important confounds that could belie this interpretation, and 
they are addressed at length in my 2012 article.80 But it is important to take 
note of the strength of the evidence presented here. By using panel data 
with state and time fixed effects, the attempt is made to rule out the 
possibility that spurious results could be obtained due to an overall national 
time trend in crime or endogeneity in passage of add-on gun laws.81 Making 
use of timing dummies relative to the law’s effective date allows for the 
detection of the dynamic response of crime relative to implementation of 
the law. 
  
 
 80. See Abrams, supra note 30. 
 81. The problem of endogeneity is a common one in the social sciences. In this case, the 
concern is that states pass add-on gun laws in response to changes in crime, making them 
unlike the ideal randomized experiment in which the timing of the law passage would be 
random. 
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TABLE 1 
GENERAL DETERRENCE: IMPACT OF ADD-ON GUN LAWS ON GUN ROBBERY RATES 
 
 Dependent Variable: Gun Robbery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
After Add-On Law 
Effective Date 
-0.142 -0.173** -0.127** -0.090 -0.168 -0.179** -0.108** -0.054* 
(0.0776) (0.0524) (0.0406) (0.0245) (0.0859) (0.0612) (0.0300) (0.0244) 
State-Specific Time Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Balanced Panel No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Restrict to Post-1974  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,516 15,516 2975 2975 12,979 12,979 2234 2234 
R-Squared 0.168 0.179 0.182 0.190 0.165 0.175 0.182 0.187 
* indicates significance at p < 0.05  ** indicates significance at p < 0.01 
Note: This table reports the impact of add-on gun laws on gun robbery rates within three years of 
the law change. The data consists of agency-year level observations. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at the state level to allow for intrastate correlation in error structure. All 
specifications include state and year fixed effects. Controls include poverty rate, unemployment 
rate, racial composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned 
population share.  
Adapted from Abrams, supra note 30. 
Several of the most recent empirical papers on general deterrence have 
now been discussed, but each uses a slightly different approach. To be 
useful, it is necessary to have one statistic with which to compare the papers: 
elasticity. Elasticity is the percentage change in one variable in response to a 
percentage change in another. The elasticity of crime with respect to 
sentence length (due to general deterrence) is defined as: 
%Δ
%Δ
Δc
Δs  
Here crime is the number of criminal acts committed annually—whether 
detected or not—and s is the mean sentence length. This quantity may be 
estimated using any of the approaches discussed above.82 
We can compare the elasticities that each of these studies find. “A quick 
back-of-the-envelope calculation yields an elasticity of approximately -0.10” 
in my 2012 article.83 This magnitude is consistent with that found by Lee 
 
 82. As discussed above, 	is a negative number since longer sentences decrease crime. 
 83. Abrams, supra note 30, at 54. 
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and McCrary.84 They bound allowable elasticities consistent with their data 
and model to have a magnitude no greater than -0.13,85 although their 
preferred parameter values yield elasticities close to 0.86 The largest recent 
empirical elasticity estimates come from Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati, 
and Pietro Vertova’s 2009 article using Italian data, in which they find a 
magnitude of -0.74 for seven months.87 This may be an indication that the 
substantially lower incarceration rate in Italy makes it difficult to extrapolate 
to the United States. A calculation using Eric Helland and Alexander 
Tabarrok’s results from examining three-strikes-induced change in a 2007 
article yields an elasticity around -0.07.88 
B. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SPECIFIC DETERRENCE 
1. Background 
While general deterrence operates on the general public through the 
threat of sanction, specific deterrence acts on the individual offender who 
has already received a punishment.89 Understanding how the length of 
sentence affects recidivism is essential to a rational criminal justice policy, so 
it should not be surprising that a number of attempts have been made to 
estimate this relationship. As discussed above, theory suggests that the 
relationship between time served and recidivism could be either positive or 
negative. Incarceration could have a rehabilitative effect, which would lead 
to a negative relationship, or a criminogenic effect, which would result in a 
positive one. Most likely both effects are present and either may dominate, 
depending on the individuals and sentence length. Any empirical study will 
only detect the net effect; it cannot distinguish the positive and negative 
components. 
A large fraction of studies on specific deterrence potentially suffer from 
a problem known as omitted variables bias (“OVB”). OVB is caused by the 
fact that most regressions do not include all of the variables that could 
impact a phenomenon. For example, many studies of specific deterrence 
 
 84. Lee & McCrary, supra note 51, at 34 (determining that the most negative sentence 
length deterrence elasticity is -0.13). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 32–33 (“The point estimates from our discontinuity analysis indicate an 
approximately 2 percent decline in the rate of criminal offending when a juvenile turns 
eighteen, when the expected incarceration length conditional on arrest jumps discontinuously 
by roughly 230 percent. This suggests a small ‘reduced-form’ elasticity of -0.007.”). 
 87. See Drago, Galbiati & Vertova, supra note 49, at 258. 
 88. See generally Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 49. 
 89. LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 125 (11th ed. 2012) (“The theory of specific 
deterrence (also called special or particular deterrence) holds that after experiencing criminal 
sanctions that are swift, sure, and powerful, known criminals will never dare repeat their 
criminal acts.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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lack information on criminal history, severity of crime, or other personal 
traits that may impact subsequent recidivism. This causes the estimates of 
the impact of sentence length on recidivism to be biased.90 Since most 
studies of specific deterrence suffer from this problem, I focus primarily on 
a few recent economic studies that attempt to explicitly account for it. They 
do so with a variety of approaches: matching techniques, regression 
discontinuity, instrumental variables, natural experiments, and even a field 
experiment. 
2. Recent Literature 
Two relatively recent reviews—Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen, and 
Cheryl Lero Jonson’s 2009 article; and Shawn D. Bushway and Raymond 
Paternoster’s 2009 article—both discuss empirical work on recidivism and 
specific deterrence (the former is a much more extensive survey).91 They 
cover a range of studies and both note the lack of consensus on the topic.92 
One important reason for the lack of consensus is that studies often seek to 
answer slightly different questions. There is variation in the definition of 
recidivism (re-arrest, re-incarceration, etc.), in whether the focus is the 
existence (the extensive margin) or amount (the intensive margin) of 
recidivism, in the duration of time subjects are monitored for recidivating 
activity, in the initial law enforcement action whose effect is being 
investigated, and in the geographic locale. 
Some recent work addresses the OVB problem squarely, using quasi-
experimental and IV techniques.93 Quasi-experimental techniques have 
leveraged one-time prisoner releases and statutory changes in sentence 
lengths.94 For example, in a 2007 article, Ilyana Kuziemko applies two 
 
 90. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13, at 115. 
 91. See Shawn D. Bushway & Raymond Paternoster, The Impact of Prison on Crime, in DO 
PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 119 (Steven Raphael & 
Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009); Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, 
Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115 (2009). 
 92. See Nagin, Cullen & Jonson, supra note 91, at 177 (“A remarkable fact is that despite 
the widespread use of imprisonment across democratic nations and the enormous expansion of 
the prison system in the United States, rigorous investigations of the effect of incarceration on 
reoffending are in short supply.”). 
 93. Cf. Paul Nieuwbeerta, Daniel S. Nagin & Arjan A.J. Blokland, Assessing the Impact of 
First-Time Imprisonment on Offenders’ Subsequent Criminal Career Development: A Matched Samples 
Comparison, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 227 (2009) (using propensity score matching to 
detect the effect of first incarceration on recidivism in the Netherlands). 
 94. For an example of the use of one-time prisoner releases to quantify specific 
deterrence, see infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova 
examine a natural experiment in Italy where all inmates incarcerated in 2006 received up to a 
three-year sentence commutation. Drago, Galbiati & Vertova, supra note 49, at 265 (“The 
[Collective Clemency Bill] reduces prison sentences by 3 years for a large number of inmates 
but does not extinguish the offense. As a consequence, on August 1, 2006, all those with a 
 
A1_ABRAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013  3:25 PM 
2013] THE IMPRISONER’S DILEMMA 931 
approaches to estimate the magnitude of specific deterrence using data 
from Georgia state prisons.95 A natural experiment that led to the release of 
901 prisoners in 1981 provides the potential to compare prisoners with 
similar sentences and varying lengths of time served, where the variation is 
determined exogenously by when their sentences began.96 The identifying 
 
residual prison sentence of less than 3 years were immediately released from residential 
facilities.”). While the experiment is dramatic and substantial deterrence is detected, the 
interpretation is difficult. Id. at 278 (“Our findings show that a policy that commutes actual 
sentences in expected sentences significantly reduces inmates’ recidivism. Moreover, the results 
provide credible evidence that a 1-month increase in expected punishment lowers the 
probability of committing a crime. This corroborates the theory of general deterrence. The 
results indicate a large deterrent effect of expected punishment.”). Since prisoners with longer 
sentence reductions also face higher penalties upon re-arrest, the net effect must be a 
combination of specific and general deterrence. Id. at 278–79. If, as some other studies suggest, 
the impact of specific deterrence is negative (less crime after longer incarceration) then 
general deterrence must dominate here since defendants who received greater commutations 
had larger drops in recidivism.  
 An even more recent paper using a European natural experiment uses the 1996 Bastille 
Day pardon in France to estimate the effect of sentence reductions on recidivism. Eric Maurin 
& Aurelie Ouss, Sentence Reductions and Recidivism: Lessons from the Bastille Day Quasi Experiment 3 
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3990, 2009), available at http:// 
ftp.iza.org/dp3990.pdf (“[I]ndividuals who were in French prisons by Bastille Day benefited 
from a basic sentence reduction of one week, plus one additional week of reduction per 
residual month of sentence by Bastille Day, with total reduction not exceeding 4 months. By 
construction, this collective pardon generated a very significant discontinuity in the relationship 
between time served in prison and prospective date of release.”). They find that a greater 
sentence reduction via the pardon leads to an increase in expected future recidivism. Id. at 21. 
For an example of the use of statutory changes in sentence length to quantify specific 
deterrence, see infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.  
 In a 2009 article, Hjalmarsson uses a regression discontinuity approach made possible by 
the Washington State juvenile-sentencing guidelines. Randi Hjalmarsson, Juvenile Jails: A Path to 
the Straight and Narrow or to Hardened Criminality?, 52 J.L. & ECON. 779, 781 (2009) (“An 
individual is sentenced to a state facility for a minimum of 15 weeks if he or she falls above a 
prespecified cutoff in the grid; otherwise, he or she receives a more minor sanction, such as a 
fine or probation. Even in the absence of random assignment to residential placement, a causal 
effect can be identified by comparing the recidivism behavior of individuals on either side of 
the prespecified cutoffs, only one group of which was incarcerated.”). She finds that juveniles 
who are incarcerated have a lower probability of recidivism than those that receive a local 
sanction that does not involve incarceration. Id. at 800 (finding that incarcerated youth have a 
thirty-seven percent lower risk of recidivism than unincarcerated youth). This is in contrast to 
the study by Paul Nieuwbeerta, Daniel S. Nagin, and Arjan A.J. Blokland discussed above, which 
found a positive effect of first incarceration on recidivism in the Netherlands. Nieuwbeerta, 
Nagin & Blokland, supra note 93, at 251. 
 95. Ilyana Kuziemko, Going Off Parole: How the Elimination of Discretionary Prison Release 
Affects the Social Cost of Crime 13–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13380, 
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13380.pdf?. 
 96. Id. at 15 (“On March 18, 1981, the governor of Georgia ordered the state’s 
Department of Corrections to free up more than 900 beds in order to reduce overcrowding in 
local jails. The GDC ranked its current non-violent inmates by day of prospective release 
(already set by the parole board) and released the first 901 on the list. Those at the top of the 
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assumption hinges sharply on there being no time trend or other direct 
relationship between date of incarceration and likelihood of recidivism. 
Using this approach and another making use of prisoner risk assessments, 
Kuziemko finds that sentence length has a substantial negative effect on 
recidivism: a three percent decline in recidivism for every extra month 
served.97 
While Kuziemko uses a one-time prisoner release to estimate specific 
deterrence, Bushway and Emily G. Owens use a statutory change in sentence 
length. Bushway and Owens take a behavioral approach to understanding 
the impact of sentence lengths on crime.98 A 2001 law change in Maryland 
provides them with a natural experiment whereby a natural reference for 
sentence length is changed but the actual sentences remain the same.99 
While not directly comparable to other studies examined, the authors find 
that shorter sentences relative to a reference point lead to higher recidivism 
rates.100 
Four recent papers take an instrumental-variables approach to the 
question of specific deterrence, three of which use very similar instruments. 
Instrumental variables are another commonly used technique to simulate a 
randomized experiment. In this context, the ideal experiment would be to 
see sentences randomly assigned to offenders so that the researcher could 
measure their subsequent recidivating behavior. Due to ethical and legal 
restrictions, researchers instead look for circumstances in which a device 
influences sentence length in a random way and does not influence 
recidivism in any other way. In a 2011 article, I use the randomly assigned 
public defender (“PD”) as the instrumental variable.101 The assumption is 
that, because PDs vary in skill, the random assignment will impact sentence 
length but will not otherwise affect recidivism. Thus, a comparison of similar 
defendants, some of whom were randomly assigned to very good PDs and 
 
list had served almost all of the time the parole board recommended, but those at the bottom 
of the list had served considerably less time than was originally recommended.”). 
 97. Id. at 24 (“The preferred estimates in Col. (4), for example, suggest that each month 
served decreases the probability of recidivism by about 3.0 percentage points . . . .”). 
 98. Shawn D. Bushway & Emily G. Owens, Framing Punishment: A New Look at 
Incarceration and Deterrence 13–16 (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
www.human.cornell.edu/pam/people/upload/Framing-Jan-2010.pdf (using, as a natural 
experiment, the revision of the voluntary Maryland Sentencing Guidelines, which increased the 
recommended sentence length for several offenses to match judges’ sentencing behavior). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 30–31 (“Conditional on the actual punishment that someone receives, 
increasing the recommended sentence by 10% will increase recidivism by 0.74 percentage 
points, roughly 1.2% of the mean. . . . Longer sentences are associated with lower recidivism 
rates.”). 
 101. Abrams, supra note 32, at 14. 
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some of whom were unlucky and had very poor ones, will give a measure of 
the specific deterrent effect of sentence length. 
3. Using Randomly Assigned Attorneys To Estimate Specific Deterrence 
In a previous article I investigated the impact of individual attorneys on 
case outcomes using data from the Office of the Clark County Public 
Defender (Las Vegas, Nevada).102 One of the central findings of this article 
is that there is substantial heterogeneity in attorney ability.103 Because public 
defenders are randomly assigned to first-time offenders and there is large 
variation in expected sentence by attorney, I use attorney assignment as an 
instrument for sentence length. Based on attorney assignment, I then 
estimate the impact of time served on recidivism.104 
An IV regression is also known as “two-stage least squares” (“2SLS”), 
where the first stage is a regression of the independent variable (sentence 
length) on the instrument (PD identity). Since sentences cannot be 
negative, I use a tobit regression for the first stage. A tobit regression is 
appropriate when the dependent variable must be non-negative. The results 
of the IV regression are best reported visually, as in Figure 4, which plots 
recidivism rates against predicted sentence length. This figure shows a 
complicated relationship between recidivism and sentence length, one that 
is not well-captured in a standard linear regression. There is a generally 
negative relationship between recidivism and sentence length, although this 
relationship does not appear to be very linear. While longer sentences may 
reduce recidivism for short sentence lengths, the effects rapidly peter out. 
The relationship is best approximated by a negative linear relationship for 
short sentence lengths and zero effect for longer ones. 
  
 
 102. See generally David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case 
Assignment To Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145 (2007). 
 103. Id. at 1166 (“Going from the tenth to ninetieth percentile of public defender ability 
decreases the defendant’s expected sentence length by 5.8 months, or 82 percent of the mean 
sentence.”). 
 104. Abrams, supra note 32, at 21 (“While longer sentences may reduce recidivism for short 
sentence lengths, the effects rapidly diminish.”). One challenge present in this context is that 
the relationships investigated are complicated and may not be well-suited to a single coefficient 
as in an ordinary least-squares or probit regression. I estimate both ordinary least-squares and 
IV regressions in this paper, using different assumptions about the sentencing distribution. 
Depending on the model for the sentencing distribution, I find either a negative relationship 
or, more frequently, no significant relationship between recidivism and sentence length. The 
relationship between the variables is not always monotonic, and I further explore it through 
non-parametric techniques. 
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FIGURE 4 
THREE-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATE VS. PREDICTED SENTENCE 
FIRST STAGE TOBIT 
 
 
 
 
Several other papers have taken similar approaches. The closest to that 
used in my 2011 paper is found in a 2009 study by Emily Turner.105 
Employing the Clark County data set used here, Turner instruments for 
sentence length using random assignment to attorney and heterogeneity in 
attorney performance.106 She finds a mostly insignificant relationship 
between sentence length and recidivism, although one that varies somewhat 
by the recidivism window.107 
In a 2013 publication Charles Loeffler uses judge-specific sentencing 
tendencies and random case assignment to obtain exogenous variation in 
 
 105. See Emily Elizabeth Turner, Using Random Case Assignment and Heterogeneity in 
Attorney Ability To Examine the Relationship Between Sentence Length and Recidivism (2009) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with University of Pennsylvania 
Library). 
 106. Id. at 3 (“Heterogeneity in attorney performance permits investigation into the 
relationship between sentence length and recidivism with random assignment to defenders 
serving as a proxy for random assignment of actual sentences.”). 
 107. Id. at 26–27 (“The results presented reveal no significant relationship between 
sentence length and recidivism within one year of street time. . . . [One] factor potentially 
affecting these results could stem from sample selection. The date range of the sample was 
based on the case opening date rather than closing because random assignment occurs when 
cases begin. This introduces the possibility for truncation bias.”). 
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sentence length.108 This study, using data from Essex County, New Jersey, 
also focuses on the extensive margin and does not find a strong relationship 
between incarceration and recidivism.109 
Donald Green and Daniel Winik in a 2010 article take a very similar 
approach to that employed by Loeffler.110 The article uses data from the 
D.C. Superior Court and both find little relationship between sentence 
length and recidivism.111 They find a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between incarceration length and recidivism using ordinary 
least-squares regressions.112 The sign becomes positive and the effect 
statistically insignificant, however, when IV estimation is performed, 
although the standard errors are larger.113 
Perhaps the single most significant contribution to the literature on 
specific deterrence comes from a little-known field experiment performed 
by the California Department of Corrections in the 1970s.114 The authors 
randomized a six-month early release among felons serving time in 1970.115 
They compare one- and two-year recidivism rates between the treatment and 
control groups and find no significant difference.116 However, a simple t-test 
on the data indicates that the early release group recidivated at a 
 
 108. Charles E. Loeffler, Does Imprisonment Alter the Life Course? Evidence on Crime and 
Employment from a Natural Experiment, CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2013) (online version at 7–8), 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9125.12000/pdf (“The 
individual sentencing tendencies of judges have long been shown to be a strong predictor of 
whether and for how long a convicted criminal will be sentenced to prison. As such, interjudge 
sentencing disparities are an appropriate form of exogenous variation: They predict assignment 
to treatment and the outcome of the treatment only through the mechanism of the treatment 
itself. Thus, for those individuals whose sentences were affected by this random variation in 
assignment to treatment, unbiased estimates of the effect of imprisonment on different life-
course outcomes can be produced.” (citations omitted)). 
 109. Id. at 15 (“In practice, judges who use substantially less imprisonment have virtually 
the same cumulative caseload recidivism rates as judges who use substantially more 
imprisonment.”). 
 110. See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments To Estimate the 
Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357 
(2010). 
 111. Id. at 381 (“[I]ncarceration seems to have little net effect on the likelihood of 
subsequent rearrest.”). 
 112. Id. at 375–76 tbl.6. 
 113. Id. at 377–78 tbl.7. 
 114. JOHN E. BERECOCHEA & DOROTHY R. JAMAN, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR., TIME SERVED IN 
PRISON AND PAROLE OUTCOME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY, REPORT NUMBER 2 (1981). 
 115. Id. at 1–6. 
 116. Id. at 16 (“Within the first year and second year following release to parole, the 
experimentals and controls did not differ on the likelihood of their being returned to 
prison . . . . And there were no statistically significant differences between the experimentals 
and controls among those who were not returned to prison. The conclusion from this project is 
that prison terms can be reduced without affecting recidivism to a significant and practical 
degree.”). 
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significantly higher rate, supporting the notion of a negative relationship 
between recidivism and sentence length.117 Taken together, these studies 
seem to find fairly consistent evidence of specific deterrence for low 
sentence ranges, but not for longer ones. I use the results of my 2011 
paper118 to calibrate the specific deterrence components of the cost–benefit 
calculation below. 
C. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF INCAPACITATION 
1. Background 
While the deterrence effects discussed so far focus on how the threat or 
experience of incarceration modifies the current or future commission of 
crime, incapacitation measures a much more direct effect: the current 
reduction in crime due to removing inmates from society.119 The values of 
the effects on incapacitation discussed below are taken not from my own 
research, but from several recent papers that produce the most credible 
estimates of the crime-reduction impact of incapacitation. I review some of 
these papers and then use their estimates in calculations in Part III.B. 
There are several important challenges inherent in incapacitation 
research. First, the relationship between incapacitation length and crime is a 
complicated one, with the causal arrow almost certainly going in both 
directions. In other words, there may be a positive correlation between 
prisoners and crime rates, but that does not mean that prison causes crime. 
The level of imprisonment surely affects crime, but the level of crime must 
also affect the prison population. Two potential solutions to this problem 
have been attempted: (1) structural modeling of the relationship and 
(2) the use of instrumental variables to break the simultaneity. The aim of 
either approach is to find a causal estimate of the elasticity of crime with 
respect to incarceration rate and/or the average number of offenses averted 
due to incapacitation (λ in the criminology literature). The advantages of IV 
strategies have been discussed above. The shortcoming of structural 
modeling is that the estimates are right only if the (untestable) model is 
correct. Still, in some circumstances the assumptions of the model may be 
reasonable and there may be few other available approaches. 
 
 117. Author’s calculations. 
 118. See Abrams, supra note 32. 
 119. SIEGEL, supra note 89, at 127 (“Placing offenders behind bars during their prime 
crime years should lessen their lifetime opportunity to commit crime. The shorter the span of 
opportunity, the fewer offenses they can commit during their lives; hence crime is reduced. 
This theory, known as the incapacitation effect, seems logical.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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2. Recent Literature 
Levitt attempts to separate incapacitation from deterrence by 
comparing the impact of arrest rates on crime rates for one crime with 
crime rates for other crimes.120 While there are endogeneity concerns with 
this approach, Levitt finds a larger impact of deterrence than 
incapacitation.121 His incapacitation estimates suggest that an additional 
person-year of incapacitation prevents 5.1 to 8.2 index crimes, depending 
on category.122 He notes that these numbers are somewhat lower than self-
reports of twelve to fifteen estimated crimes per year.123 This disparity could 
be due to multiple-offender commission of single crimes.124 Offender 
reports also do not account for “replacement” effects—the result that 
foregone crimes not committed by incarcerated offenders are likely to be at 
least partially replaced by non-incarcerated individuals.125 
Some of the best recent work on incapacitation was published in an 
issue of the Journal of Quantitative Criminology organized by Shawn D. 
Bushway and Peter Reuter. The papers in this issue summarize much 
previous work from both the economic and criminology perspectives, and 
add new estimates. An article by Alex R. Piquero and Alfred Blumstein 
surveys much of the recent literature and reports on estimates of the 
elasticity of crime with respect to incapacitation: 
Estimates of the crime-reduction potential of incapacitation are 
both numerous and diverse, reflecting different assumptions made 
by different researchers (Cohen 1983; Visher 1987). Most 
incapacitation studies suggest that prison exerts a significant 
suppression effect on crime; however, the estimated effects vary 
markedly from study to study depending on the extent of 
incapacitation, how much the prison population is increased, and 
the values of the model parameters used (Spelman 2000a; 
Weatherburn et al. 2006). In an early review, Cohen (1978, pp. 
219–221) estimated elasticities of -0.05 to -0.70, while Spelman’s 
(1994, p. 220) estimates ranged from -0.12 to -0.20, with a best 
guess estimate of -0.16. DiIulio and Piehl (1991), using Wisconsin 
prisoner data from 1989, report an elasticity estimate of -0.22, 
while Piehl and DiIulio’s (1995) analysis of New Jersey offender 
data indicates an elasticity estimate of -0.26. Likewise, Weatherburn 
 
 120. See Levitt, supra note 16. 
 121. Id. at 368–69 & tbl.7 (finding that deterrence is generally a stronger predictor of the 
effects of arrest than is incapacitation). 
 122. Id. at 369–70. 
 123. Id. at 370. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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and colleagues (2006) carried out an analysis of burglary offenders 
from New South Wales and obtained an adjusted elasticity of 
burglary with respect to imprisonment of -0.3. Many of these 
estimates include an elasticity of -0.2, meaning that a 5% increase 
in the prison population would achieve a 1% reduction in crime.126 
Piquero and Blumstein include a number of studies that do not 
overcome the endogenous relationship between incarceration rates and 
crime. Still, the range of elasticities (-0.3 to -0.2) estimated in these studies 
are not far off from others that attempt to deal with this problem more 
explicitly.127 I summarize the elasticity estimates from the most reliable 
studies in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
INCAPACITATION 
Paper λ (Crimes/Year Avoided) Elasticity 
Marvell & Moody (1994)  0.16 
Levitt (1996) 5–8 0.31 
Sweeten & Apel (2007) 4.9–8.4  
Bhati (2007)—person 1.93 0.93 
Bhati (2007)—property 9.47 0.69 
Owens (2009) 1.5  
Johnson & Raphael 
(2011)—property 
9 0.15–0.21 
Johnson & Raphael 
(2011)—violent 
0.15 o.06–0.11 
Note: This table reports estimates from selected papers of averted crimes due to incapacitation and 
incapacitation elasticity of crime. 
Sources: Avinash Singh Bhati, Estimating the Number of Crimes Averted by Incapacitation: An Information 
Theoretic Approach, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 355, 369 fig.4 (2007); Levitt, supra note 12, at 
345 tbl.8; Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Jr., Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction, 
10 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 109, 133 (1994); Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating 
the Incapacitation Effect of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551, 554 (2009); Sweeten & Apel, 
supra note 16, at 318; Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much Crime Reduction Does the 
Marginal Prisoner Buy? 2–3 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/johnson_raphael_crimeincarcJLE.pdf. 
In the same issue of the Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Avinash Singh 
Bhati uses a structural model of the offending process to estimate the 
 
 126. Alex R. Piquero & Alfred Blumstein, Does Incapacitation Reduce Crime?, 23 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 267, 270 (2007). 
 127. See id. 
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incapacitation effect.128 He estimates his information-theoretic model using 
data from about a dozen state prisons on inmates released in 1994.129 He 
finds estimates of mean crimes averted that are in line with other studies. 
For property crimes, an average of 8.47 are averted per year of 
incarceration; the mean is 1.93 for crimes against persons.130 Bhati’s 
elasticity estimates are substantially larger in magnitude than much other 
work, with a mean of 0.93 for crimes against persons and 0.69 for property 
crimes.131 
In a 2009 article Emily G. Owens uses a natural experiment to attempt 
to estimate the magnitude of the incapacitation effect.132 A 2001 change in 
Maryland law reduced sentences for young offenders with juvenile 
records.133 Owens is thus able to gain a causal estimate of incapacitation on 
crime for this group. She finds a comparatively low impact of the foregone 
incarceration: about 1.5 crimes per year, a number several times lower than 
other estimates.134 This may be because the affected group is a particularly 
low-offending one. 
Most recently, in a 2011 article, Rucker Johnson and Steven Raphael 
use the fact that incarceration rates adjust to permanent shocks with a 
dynamic lag in order to estimate incapacitation effects.135 They find 
“elasticities of between -0.06 and -0.11 for violent crime and between -0.15 
and -0.21 for property crime.”136 Moreover, they present evidence that the 
magnitude of the elasticities has declined in more recent years.137 
Examined together, there is a good deal of variation in incapacitation 
elasticities (Table 2). Thus for the main cost–benefit analysis, I choose 
estimates in the middle of the range but examine the impact of variation in 
the incapacitation effect as part of the sensitivity analysis. 
 
 128. Avinash Singh Bhati, Estimating the Number of Crimes Averted by Incapacitation: An 
Information Theoretic Approach, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 355, 357 (2007). 
 129. Id. at 361 (“[Bureau of Justice Statistics] tracked a sample of 38,624 prisoners released 
from 15 state prisons in 1994 for a period of 3 years.”). 
 130. Id. at 36566. 
 131. Id. at 36869. 
 132. Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence 
Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551, 55154 (2009). 
 133. Id. at 554 (“On July 1, 2001, a policy change reduced the age at which an offender’s 
juvenile record was excluded from the criminal history, from 26 to 23 years.”). 
 134. Id. (“[O]ffenders are arrested at a mean rate of 2.8 times per year and are involved in 
approximately 1.5 index crimes . . . .”). 
 135. Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much Crime Reduction Does the Marginal 
Prisoner Buy? 31–32 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/johnson_raphael_crimeincarcJLE.pdf. 
 136. Id. at 23. 
 137. Id. (finding smaller elasticities for the 19912004 time period compared to the 
19781990 time period, suggesting “that recent increases in incarceration have generated 
much less bang-per-buck in terms of crime reduction”). 
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D. COST OF CRIME 
Of crucial importance in thinking about incarceration from a utilitarian 
perspective is the ability to use a single measure to balance the different 
costs and benefits that it produces. Although it may seem inadequate, or in 
some cases inappropriate, the approach that economists take is to 
denominate all the quantities in dollars. This requires determining the cost 
of crime, the figure in this calculus with perhaps the greatest uncertainty. 
There are several primary methods used to estimate the costs of crime, 
of which I focus on the two most prominent: the bottom-up and the top-
down approaches.138 Research using the bottom-up approach attempts to list 
all the ways in which crime can inflict costs on society, then it estimates each 
of these costs and aggregates them.139 The other primary approach goes by 
several different names: top-down, willingness-to-pay, or contingent 
valuation. Rather than aggregating up various costs, research using this 
method relies on surveys of individuals that ask a series of questions aimed at 
determining the total amount that a reduction in crime would be worth. 
The first challenge of the bottom-up approach is to enumerate all of the 
potential social costs of crime.140 Mark Cohen and co-authors have written 
extensively about calculating the cost of crime from this perspective. For 
example, in a 1988 study by Cohen, he uses a variety of data sources to 
estimate medical costs and lost wages.141 To this, he adds “pain and 
suffering” costs by comparing the distribution of injuries with jury awards in 
personal injury cases.142 Ted R. Miller, Cohen, and Brian Wiersema, in a 
1996 article, take a similar approach, but the jury awards are from cases 
 
 138. The other main approach that I do not detail here is called hedonic pricing. This 
approach infers the cost of crime by comparing similar assets, for example houses, that vary 
only by the area crime rates where they are located. There has not been much recent research 
along these lines because it is very difficult to find such comparisons where crime rates are the 
only difference. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, A Note on the Value of Crime Control: Evidence from the 
Property Market, 5 J. URB. ECON. 137 (1978). 
 139. See, e.g., TED R. MILLER, MARK A. COHEN & BRIAN WIERSEMA, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 1 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles/victcost.pdf; Mark A. Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime 
to Victims, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 537 (1988); Mark A. Cohen, Ted R. Miller & Shelli B. Rossman, 
The Costs and Consequences of Violent Behavior in the United States, in 4 UNDERSTANDING AND 
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROL 67, 69–70 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey 
Roth eds., 1994). 
 140. Some of the costs included are not truly social costs as economists traditionally think 
of them. For example, $100 stolen from an individual and gained by the thief would count as 
no net social cost. In the cost of crime literature, this distinction is usually made by calling the 
aggregate costs “external costs.” I use the term social costs here for convenience. 
 141. Cohen, supra note 139, at 542–43 (describing the use of insurance claim data, survey 
data on lost work days by injury, and data on court awards for injuries to estimate medical costs 
and lost wages). 
 142. Id. at 543–44 (describing the use of jury-awards data to estimate pain and suffering). 
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involving crimes.143 Implicit in this approach is the assumption that juries 
are making awards of the amounts that individuals would be “willing to 
accept” to offset the crime. Of course, the shortcoming of these studies is 
that they omit a number of important costs. In a 1994 article, Cohen, Miller, 
and Shelli B. Rossman do include estimates of criminal justice costs, but this 
still leaves out a number of potentially important costs, such as fear, 
avoidance, costs to the offender, and costs to the community.144 
Table 3 summarizes the cost of crime estimates from several different 
papers, which use differing methodologies. One may note the substantial 
variation in the estimates across both crime categories and methodologies. 
The contingent valuation methodology used in Cohen, Miller, and 
Rossman’s 1994 article tends to give the highest estimates for most types of 
crime. This may be due to the fact that costs not included in a bottom-up 
approach are included with a contingent valuation approach. This approach 
more directly obtains the value that is appropriate for a utilitarian 
calculation, the total cost to society.145 To do so, surveys ask respondents 
questions like, “Would you be willing to pay an extra $200 to reduce the 
likelihood of burglary by 10%?” Follow-up questions raise or lower the 
monetary amount to attempt to elicit the true value of the crime reduction 
to the respondent. By aggregating data from hundreds or thousands of 
subjects, these studies attempt to arrive at an average willingness-to-pay to 
avoid crime. 
  
 
 143. See MILLER, COHEN & WIERSEMA, supra note 139, at 2 (describing the use of data from 
the National Crime Victimization Survey, which “polls people over age 12 about rape, robbery, 
assault, larceny, burglary, and motor vehicle theft”). 
 144. See Cohen, Miller & Rossman, supra note 139, at 91–101 (quantifying victim costs, 
including medical care, mental health care, and lost cash and property, but not quantifying 
indirect monetary and nonmonetary losses). 
 145. See Mark A. Cohen & Alex R. Piquero, New Evidence on the Monetary Value of Saving a 
High Risk Youth, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 25, 35 (2009) (explaining that contingent 
valuation studies reduce the drawback of “bottom-up” studies not accounting for all potential 
costs of crime by asking individuals “to assess their value of reduced crime—regardless of what 
the cost components are”). 
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TABLE 3 
COST OF CRIME 
 Bottom-Up CV Propensity Model 
Crime Type 
Cohen 
(1988) 
Miller, 
Cohen & 
Wiersema 
(1996) 
French & 
McCollister 
(2008) 
Cohen, 
Miller & 
Rossman 
(2004) 
Roman 
(2012)
Mean 
Roman 
(2012) 
Median 
Rape 103,525 131,287 222,374 267,884 158,293 19,150 
Robbery 25,522 19,618 47,078 262,233 282,654 90,052 
Assault 24,375 23 124,285 79,122 136,493 67,496 
Burglary 2780 2264 4418 28,258 4501 792 
Motor Vehicle Theft 6337 6036 9258 5481 15,369 6887 
Theft 367 558 1494 829 2689 194 
Source: Adapted from John K. Roman, How Do We Measure the Severity of Crimes? New Estimates of the Cost of 
Criminal Victimization, in 17 MEASURING CRIME & CRIMINALITY: ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 37, 
61–62 (John MacDonald ed., 2011), and adjusted to 2010 dollars. CV indicates contingent valuation 
methodology.  
While contingent valuation studies are more inclusive than bottom-up 
studies, they have some shortcomings as well. They rely on subjective 
responses by individuals to hypothetical questions rather than actual market 
transactions. Individuals may very well overestimate their willingness to pay 
in order to seem more altruistic to the surveyor or simply because of the 
absence of the need to actually make a payment.146 This method is also 
sensitive to public knowledge of crime, which some studies have suggested 
can be quite inaccurate.147 
Nevertheless, there are several recent studies that have used the 
contingent valuation approach. These studies generally have found higher 
costs of crime than studies that use the bottom-up approach.148 The studies 
tend to focus on particular crimes or regions. For example, in a 2001 article, 
Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook employ the contingent valuation approach 
to quantify the benefits of reducing gun violence,149 whereas Cohen and 
Piquero examine several different types of crime.150 Cohen, Rust, Steen & 
 
 146. Mark A. Cohen, Valuing Crime Control Benefits Using Stated Preference Approaches, in COST–
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND CRIME CONTROL 73, 100–02 (John K. Roman, Terence Dunworth & 
Kevin Marsh eds., 2010). 
 147. See id. at 103–08. 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 81 (“In the case of rape, Cohen and his coauthors (2004) used a 
willingness-to-pay [contingent valuation] methodology and estimated the cost to be $237,000 
in 2000 dollars. This is about twice the estimate using the bottom-up approach . . . .”); id. at 88–
89 tbl.4.4. 
 149. See Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, The Benefits of Reducing Gun Violence: Evidence from 
Contingent-Valuation Survey Data, 22 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 207 (2001). 
 150. Cohen & Piquero, supra note 145, at 27. 
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Tidd’s 2004 article is one of the most comprehensive contingent valuation 
studies, having sampled hundreds of subjects about an array of different 
crimes.151 I use this study as the basis of some of the crime cost estimates in 
the cost–benefit calculation. 
An additional limitation of most cost of crime studies is that they do not 
account for the substantial variation in crime costs, even within a particular 
crime category. Almost all crime studies to date report just one number, the 
mean expected cost of a particular category of crime. As discussed above, 
even getting to this value is a monumental challenge. This data limitation is 
a large part of the reason why there have been few prior attempts at cost–
benefit analysis of incarceration and why those attempts that have been 
performed have had large uncertainties.152 Most realistic changes in prison 
policy will cause an increase or decrease in crime, but the extra or averted 
crimes will likely have a cost well below the average crime. Until recently, 
though, crime cost data was not detailed enough to value these low cost 
crimes. 
A recent paper by John Roman acknowledges the heterogeneity in 
crime severity, even within a particular category, and attempts to estimate its 
magnitude.153 The intuition can be illustrated by considering the cost of a 
robbery. Most robberies will not involve physical harm to the victim, and 
thus the principal costs will be loss of property, psychological, and criminal 
justice costs. But in some robberies (fifteen percent or fewer, according to 
Jennifer L. Truman’s 2010 report) the victim will be injured, adding 
medical bills, increasing psychological costs, criminal justice costs, and other 
intangibles.154 Most robberies will have low costs, but the few particularly 
violent ones with much higher costs will substantially raise the average. 
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of costs of a typical crime category. The 
bulk of crimes have low costs as depicted by the much higher line for low 
dollar amounts, but there is a long tail with higher costs. This causes the 
mean crime cost to be much higher than the median cost. 
In considering policy changes, it is crucial to recognize that crime costs 
are distributed this way and that the cost of the marginal crime deterred or 
 
 151. Mark A. Cohen, Roland T. Rust, Sara Steen & Simon T. Tidd, Willingness-To-Pay for 
Crime Control Programs, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 89 (2004); see also Cohen, supra note 146, at 87 tbl.4.3. 
 152. John J. DiIulio, Jr. & Anne Morrison Piehl, Does Prison Pay? The Stormy National Debate 
over the Cost-Effectiveness of Imprisonment, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1991, at 28; John J. Donohue III, 
Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: Overall Changes and the Benefits on the Margin, in DO 
PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM, supra note 91, at 269, 
302–03. 
 153. See John K. Roman, How Do We Measure the Severity of Crimes? New Estimates of the Cost of 
Criminal Victimization, in 17 MEASURING CRIME & CRIMINALITY: ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL 
THEORY 37 (John MacDonald ed., 2011). 
 154. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010, 
at 7 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf. 
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not deterred may well be substantially different from the mean cost. In the 
next Part, I use this fact to obtain much more realistic estimates of the 
impacts of particular policy changes.155 Later, I discuss how this differs from 
previous analyses and leads to substantially different and clearer 
predictions.156 
The main reason previous studies have generally not incorporated the 
substantial heterogeneity in crime cost was due to the lack of empirical 
estimates of this heterogeneity. John K. Roman’s 2011 paper uses a similar 
approach to Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema’s bottom-up approach to 
calculating crime cost, but makes use of a substantially more detailed data 
set of jury awards.157 This allows him to not only improve upon the earlier 
work of Cohen and his coauthors by gaining a more precise estimate of 
mean crime cost but also to add information about the distribution of the 
crime costs (Table 4).158 Roman uses propensity-score matching in order to 
partially control for the fact that jury awards may vary between crime and 
non-crime cases.159 
  
 
 155. See infra Part III. 
 156. See infra Part IV. 
 157. See MILLER, COHEN & WIERSEMA, supra note 139; Roman, supra note 153, at 42–45. 
 158. Roman, supra note 153, at 57–59. 
 159. Id. at 51; see also ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 13, at 86–91 (discussing some of the 
technique’s limitations); Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity 
Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983) (giving an introduction 
to propensity scores). 
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FIGURE 5 
LONG-TAIL PROPERTY OF COST OF CRIME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond a better understanding of how much crime costs can vary within 
a particular type of crime, incarceration policies would be better informed if 
we knew how crime costs vary according to other characteristics. For 
example, it is well-known that age is an important predictor of the rate of 
offending, but almost nothing is known about how the cost of crime varies 
with offender age. 
TABLE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF CRIME COST 
 
Crime Type Mean 90% 75% Median 25% 10% 
Rape 151,454 241,443 217,191 19,150 3,569 1,411 
Robbery 282,654 612,964 338,792 90,052 69,200 19,150 
Assault 136,493 338,792 157,255 567,496 13,455 619 
Burglary 5,267 6,256 2,619 927 263 14 
Motor Vehicle Theft 17,984 46,337 20,146 8,059 3,022 45 
Source: Adapted from Roman, supra note 153, at 57, 59, and adjusted to 2010 dollars. 
 
One recent paper by Cohen and Piquero does examine how costs vary 
by age of offender for a group of repeat offenders.160 They also examine how 
the cost of crimes committed by individuals varies by the number of police 
 
 160. Cohen & Piquero, supra note 145, at 31 & tbl.3, 39 & tbl.8, 40 & fig.1. 
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contacts.161 This is exactly the type of data that can be extremely valuable to 
policymakers when considering what groups to release and what costs to 
expect. In this Article I use the findings of crime cost variation by crime 
category—but not by other characteristics—because of limits on available 
information on the incarcerated population and crime along other 
dimensions. 
E. COST OF INCARCERATION 
1. Cost of Prisons 
Any policy change that decreases the prison population will increase the 
likelihood and costs of crime, but will also decrease the total costs to the 
government of imprisonment. In this Subpart, I discuss estimates of the 
direct costs of imprisonment, which include costs of feeding, housing, and 
monitoring prisoners; healthcare costs; and capital costs. In the next 
Subpart, I discuss additional costs associated with prison, many of which 
currently have no monetary estimates. 
One simple way to estimate incarceration costs per prisoner is by simply 
obtaining state budget data and dividing it by the prison population. The 
most recent studies that report such data come from the Vera Institute of 
Justice and the Pew Center on the States.162 These studies differ slightly in 
their methodologies, with the Vera Institute adding expenditures that 
appear in state budgets but are outside the states’ corrections budgets.163 
The Vera study reports data for 2010,164 whereas the Pew study has data 
from 2006 and 2008.165 Additionally, the Vera study only includes forty 
states,166 while the Pew study covers all fifty.167 
Nonetheless, the findings of the two studies are quite similar, with an 
average annual cost per inmate of $31,360 (in 2010 dollars) in the Vera 
study and $31,537 (in 2008 dollars) in the Pew study.168 This amounts to a 
 
 161. Id. at 30 & tbl.2. 
 162. CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF 
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS (2012), available at http://www.vera.org/ 
download?file=3542/Price%2520of%2520Prisons_updated%2520version_072512.pdf; PEW 
CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008) [hereinafter PEW, ONE 
IN 100], available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in% 
20100.pdf. 
 163. These costs include such items as retiree health care costs for corrections employees, 
employee benefits, pension contributions, capital costs, and hospital and other health care costs 
for inmates. See HENRICHSON & DELANEY, supra note 162, at 2. 
 164. See id. at 3. 
 165. See PEW, ONE IN 100, supra note 162, at 5. 
 166. See HENRICHSON & DELANEY, supra note 162, at 6. 
 167. See PEW, ONE IN 100, supra note 162, at 8. 
 168. See HENRICHSON & DELANEY, supra note 162; PEW, ONE IN 100, supra note 162. 
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daily expenditure of approximately $86. These figures are in line with those 
found in previous works.169 
Beyond the relative consistency in average daily prison costs, there is 
substantial variation across states. Both the Vera and Pew studies find that 
some states’ annual costs are below $15,000 per prisoner, while others range 
above $50,000. Some of this is due to regional variation, with northeastern 
and western states averaging over $40,000 per prisoner per year, while the 
average in the South is only $22,000 per year. Costs per prisoner may also 
vary due to the differences in the capacities at which state prisons operate. 
Generally, operating a prison at or above capacity tends to decrease costs per 
inmate. 
Since by far the largest component of prison costs—over two-thirds—is 
spent on employee compensation, it should come as no surprise that there is 
substantial regional variation.170 Twenty-six percent of costs go to prisoner 
living expenses, with medical care accounting for just under half of that 
component (Figure 6).171 Utilities, housing, and food make up the rest (with 
food accounting for just four percent of overall prison expenditures).172 
Capital expenditures also account for only four percent of the prison 
expenditures.173 
  
 
 169. In a 2007 article, David M. Bierie reports daily costs of $58 to $76 (2005 dollars) in 
Maryland, depending on the security level of the facility. David M. Bierie, Cost Matters: 
Application and Advancement of Economic Methods To Inform Policy Choice in Criminology 
157 tbl.11 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland), available at 
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/6786/1/umi-umd-4271.pdf. These costs likely 
exclude some of the items identified in Vera’s study and, thus, are likely 10–20% lower than 
actual costs. In a 2004 article James J. Stephan reports average operating costs of $62 per day 
(2001 dollars) in 2001, calculated using census data. JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. Levitt cites several previous estimated costs of prison. See Levitt, 
supra note 12. These include Joel Waldfogel’s 1993 article that estimated annual costs at 
$28,500 and John J. DiIulio and Anne Morrison Piehl’s 1995 article that estimated $25,000. Id. 
at 347. A 1998 article by John Donohue and Peter Siegelman put the annual cost at $35,000, 
but this includes prisoners’ estimated lost earnings and, therefore, is not comparable to the 
other figures. Id. 
 170. See STEPHAN, supra note 169, at 4. 
 171. Id. at 6. This figure is from the most recent data available in 2001. Given the 
tremendous growth in healthcare costs since then, they almost certainly comprise the majority 
of prisoner living expenses today. 
 172. Id. at 6–7. 
 173. Id. at 4–5. 
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For purposes of the cost–benefit analysis, I don’t consider the average 
prisoner, but rather the one likely to be affected by the examined policy 
change. Since data on prison costs are sparse to begin with, it is unsurprising 
that there are no studies that attempt to estimate variation in cost per 
prisoner. In all likelihood there is no substantial variation beyond that due 
to regional variation and different levels of security—most prisoners are 
subject to similar conditions. Therefore, I will use $86 as the base daily cost 
of imprisonment. 
2. Lost Productivity and the Value of Freedom 
While incarcerated, offenders are restricted from performing work that 
could be beneficial both to themselves and to society. They also lose a 
number of other opportunities afforded to those who are free, including the 
right to spend time with loved ones and friends, to eat what they please, to 
engage in preferred activities, and to go where they would like. 
Some commentators believe that inmates’ lost freedom should not be 
incorporated into any sort of cost–benefit or welfare analysis.174 Foregone 
 
 174. Because of controversy over whether to include the value of freedom in cost–benefit 
analyses, some studies have expressly excluded value of freedom. See, e.g., Cohen, Miller & 
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wages may be included since they could give an estimate of societal and not 
just offender loss due to gains from employment.175 Whether to include the 
impact on families and friends is also a difficult question.176 
In addition to the question of whether to include offenders’ loss of 
freedom, one must determine how to quantify this seemingly abstract 
concept. The only recent paper on the subject is my 2011 article with Chris 
Rohlfs, which examined the most common domestic example of people 
literally paying for their freedom: bail.177 Since bail is not generally set 
randomly, we made use of the random variation in bail amounts induced by 
the Philadelphia Bail Experiment to estimate defendants’ willingness to pay 
for freedom.178 The subjects of the study were all accused of felonies and 
most were eventually convicted and incarcerated. Thus, the application of 
this study’s findings to the present study is appropriate. 
The estimates of the value of freedom range substantially. We estimated 
the value of freedom for serious offenders at approximately $1000 for 90 
days of freedom.179 For less serious offenders, the value of freedom is 
estimated at $6800 for 90 days, though this estimate has a great deal of 
uncertainty.180 While the value for serious offenders may seem low, the 
characteristics of the population help explain it. Only twenty-five percent of 
the serious offenders in the sample were employed, and those who were 
 
Rossman, supra note 139 at 83 (“[Another] potential cost is the value of lost freedom to an 
incarcerated offender. Beyond the social productivity loss, some would argue that society 
should consider the impact that prison has on the offender. Even if one wanted to include this 
as a cost element, it is particularly difficult to monetize.”); Jeff L. Lewin & William N. Trumbull, 
The Social Value of Crime?, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 271, 278 (1990) (“We believe that the 
exclusion of criminal gains is mandated by the fundamental premises underlying welfare 
economics and cost–benefit analysis, which require that economists respect the constraints 
imposed by political and social institutions. Treating criminal gains as a contribution to social 
welfare ignores the reality that certain acts are not permitted but are expressly prohibited by 
criminal legislation.” (footnote omitted)). But see Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 13, at 753–54 
(estimating inmates’ value of freedom in order to determine the socially optimal level of bail). 
 175. See Mark A. Cohen, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Crime and Justice, in 4 CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 2000: MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 263, 274 (David Duffee ed., 
2000). 
 176. Id. (considering the psychological cost to the offender’s family as a cost of society’s 
response to crime). 
 177. See Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 13. 
 178. Id. at 751 (“[J]udges randomly assigned to the treatment group were given bail 
guidelines to use, while members of the control group set bail as they had previously. The bail 
guidelines caused the treatment judges to set considerably lower levels of bail than those set by 
the control group. . . . This experiment allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of 
bail on posting, failure-to-appear at trial, and rearrests.”). 
 179. Id. at 767 (estimating a criminal defendant to forego an average of $949 for every 90 
days of incarceration). 
 180. Id. at 766 (estimating the value of freedom of a less serious offender to be $6770 for 
every 90 days of incarceration). 
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likely earned close to the minimum wage, around $300 per week.181 This 
yields an expected loss of wages of around $1000 when accounting for all of 
the unemployed defendants, a figure that is similar to the estimated value of 
freedom. 
The value of freedom also will incorporate any other differences 
between incarceration and freedom. These differences include foregone 
wages that the defendant could have been earning while incarcerated. This 
also includes the impact on friends and family, to the extent the inmate 
internalizes these effects. It also could include positive benefits from 
healthcare and reliable meals, which may be important to some of the most 
impoverished offenders.182 
3. Other Costs of Incarceration 
Thus far, this Article has focused on a number of mechanisms that 
should account for the first-order impacts of changes in incarceration. 
Before proceeding to the calculations of the impact of the proposed policy 
changes, I will briefly discuss other potential mechanisms by which 
incarceration changes could impact a cost–benefit analysis.183 
Incarcerating offenders will lower other criminal justice costs, including 
those for policing, courts, and probation officers. I account for these costs by 
assuming that a large fraction of offenders would otherwise be on probation 
if they were not incarcerated and that these costs would be of similar 
magnitude. 
A large number of inmates would likely impose costs on the state 
through welfare, foodstamps, and other social benefits if they were free. 
Thus, this may be seen as a net saving. At the same time, detention facilities 
must provide medical and mental health care to their wards. These costs are 
included in the costs of prisons, so it is likely that there is no appreciable net 
cost–benefit effect from social benefits. 
One concern often raised about incarceration is its impact on long-term 
employment prospects.184 A forward-looking offender should incorporate 
 
 181. Id. at 767. 
 182. The estimates are also likely to be a lower bound, since some offenders are likely credit 
constrained; therefore, they would be willing to pay more to avoid incarceration, but cannot 
borrow. 
 183. This list is not exhaustive, and any calculation like the one in this Article will 
necessarily be limited. 
 184. See BIBAS, supra note 11, at 22 (“Rather than reintegrating convicts, it exiled them 
from society for years, making it hard for them to resume law-abiding lives when they returned. 
One of the biggest barriers to reentry was that prisons bred idleness, not job skills and 
responsibilities.”); see also Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12003, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w12003.pdf (investigating the labor market consequences of increasing sentence 
length). 
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this into the value of freedom. Diminished job opportunities may also result 
in higher recidivism rates, which are reflected in a lower specific deterrence 
estimate.185 
Rehabilitation is sometimes put forth as a goal of incarceration.186 While 
I do not attempt to quantify rehabilitation in moral dimensions, the 
economic effects may be quantified in terms of increased job prospects and 
decreased criminality. As mentioned above, any change in offending 
behavior due to incarceration will be incorporated into the specific 
deterrence estimates. 
Much has been written about the long-term societal consequences of 
mass incarceration.187 These are perhaps the most difficult elements to 
quantify, and include such phenomena as the promotion of racial stigma, 
poverty, absent parents, loss of economic mobility, distorted marriage 
markets for black women, detrimental effects on children, and increases in 
juvenile crime.188 These large-scale, societal harms are certainly of a 
magnitude that they would significantly impact a cost–benefit analysis. 
However, in this Article I confine myself only to the consideration of policy 
changes with relatively short-term impacts on incarceration. Because the 
policy changes discussed in this Article do not result in the abolition of the 
large-scale use of incarceration in society, I assume that these long-term 
effects will remain relatively unchanged.189 
 
 185. Of course, many potential offenders may not fully account for these future costs, 
which would make the value of freedom an underestimate. 
 186. Cf. BIBAS, supra note 11, at 15 (“In the twentieth century, rehabilitation- and then 
retribution-speak resurged in popular and academic discussion. But these theories did not 
reverse the fundamental shape of criminal justice in practice. In the professionalized world of 
lawyers, criminal justice remained fundamentally a mechanism of social control through 
prison.”). 
 187. See, e.g., James P. Lynch & William J. Sabol, Assessing the Effects of Mass Incarceration on 
Informal Social Control in Communities, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 267, 267 (2004) (finding 
that mass incarceration weakens “family formation, labor force attachments, and patterns of 
social interaction among residents”); Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market: Consequences of 
Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 410, 410 (2001) (reviewing the evidence to find a negative 
effect of incarceration on earnings). 
 188. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 11, at 134 (“Incarceration also cuts prisoners off from their 
families, friends, and neighbors. Responsibilities as husbands and fathers are key factors that 
tame young men’s wildness and encourage them to settle down. Thus, prisoners who do not 
maintain family relationships are much more likely to reoffend. Careful empirical studies 
confirm that marriage and fatherhood appear to inhibit crime after release; one longitudinal 
study found that marriage may reduce reoffending by 35%.”). 
 189. Some other potential costs not explicitly accounted for include the increased spread 
of disease among inmates and crime committed within prisons, including prison rape. These 
costs are largely borne by the inmates, and thus, should be incorporated in the value of 
freedom. 
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An additional cost that has not been included is the deadweight loss of 
taxation.190 This is simply the notion that since taxes distort choices (for 
example, an individual will work less than she would otherwise if she must 
pay income tax) they impose a social cost. Since incarceration is paid for out 
of tax revenue, these costs should be adjusted upward to account for the 
deadweight loss. Estimates for appropriate adjustment factors range from 
twenty-five percent upward.191  
Some cost–benefit analyses incorporate this cost, while others do not. 
For the purposes of this analysis and the vast majority of proposed policy 
changes, the correct approach is to not incorporate the deadweight loss.192 
Louis Kaplow illustrates the intuition well in a 2004 paper with an example 
relevant to this article.193 Assume that a crime-reduction strategy provides a 
benefit to individuals of 3% of income, and can be financed with a 2.5% 
increase in taxes. With no labor force distortion this clearly passes the cost–
benefit test, but one might expect the increased tax rate to decrease the 
amount each individual works to such an extent that the policy would not 
have a net benefit. In actuality, individuals will not reduce their labor supply 
because the crime-reducing policy increases the utility of income such that it 
offsets the higher tax rate. For example, individuals may be less fearful of 
theft and so will work more even though taxes have increased. Therefore I 
proceed to the cost–benefit calculation with no need to account for 
deadweight loss of taxation. 
 
 190. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 674 (1999). 
 191. JIM SAXTON, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX RATE DEDUCTIONS 13 (2001), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/ 
public (select “April” and ”2001” from pull-down menus; click “Go”; follow “Economic 
Benefits” hyperlink) (“The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) incorporates a 25 
percent deadweight loss measure into federal cost–benefit analyses. OMB rules require that 
each additional dollar of tax revenue count as a cost of $1.25 because taxes ‘create an excess 
burden which is a net loss to society.’ Therefore, for new government projects to make 
economic sense, they must generate benefits at least 25 percent greater than their explicit 
financing costs.” (emphasis omitted)). “Scholarly research finds that the deadweight loss 
associated with general taxation ranges from 25 to 40 cents per dollar raised. An OMB ‘rule of 
thumb’ assumes that the deadweight loss associated with federal taxation equals 25-percent of 
revenues.” Jerry Ellig & Jerry Brito, Toward a More Perfect Union: Regulatory Analysis and 
Performance Management, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 1, 13–14 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 192. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of 
Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513 (1996). 
 193. Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government 
Policy, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2004, at 159, 161–62. 
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III. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THREE POLICY CHANGES 
A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Before computing the costs and benefits of imprisonment and averted 
crime, it is necessary to have a clear framework for how the components will 
be quantified and aggregated. The simplest way to do so is by going through 
each policy change and writing down an equation for the costs and the 
benefits. 
First, I introduce several concepts that will be used throughout. As 
discussed in detail in Part II, each of the main mechanisms by which changes 
in sentencing may affect crime is measured somewhat differently. For 
general deterrence, scholars tend to estimate an elasticity of crime. As noted 
above, elasticity is the percentage change in one variable in response to a 
percentage change in another. 
%Δ
%Δ
Δc
Δs  
Here crime is the number of criminal acts committed annually (whether 
or not detected) and s is the mean sentence length. This quantity may be 
estimated using natural experiments or event studies, as in Kessler and Levitt 
and Abrams.194 
Studies on specific deterrence tend to focus on the impact changes in 
time served have on subsequent recidivism rates. They estimate a derivative, 
, the change in recidivism rate in response to a one-unit change in 
sentence length.195 As discussed in Part II, specific deterrence seems to be 
effective for relatively short sentences, but then falls to zero.196 Since 
recidivism tends to be defined as a binary variable (either an ex-inmate does 
or does not reoffend during a time interval after release), in order to find an 
expected change in crime rate, one must use an estimate of average 
offending rate. 
The average offending rate is usually denoted by the Greek letter , 
representing the number of additional crimes a prisoner would be 
responsible for annually when released.197 As illustrated below,  is necessary 
 
 194. Abrams, supra note 30; Kessler & Levitt, supra note 12. As discussed above,  is a 
negative number because longer sentences decrease crime. See supra note 82 and accompanying 
text. 
 195.  could theoretically be positive if criminal capital accumulation outweighed the 
rehabilitative or deterrent effect of incarceration, but this does not appear to be empirically 
supported. See supra Part I.B. 
 196. For simplicity, I assume it has a linear effect to some cutoff, and then an effect of zero. 
 197. This is assumed to be the number of crimes committed in the “replacement” value, 
the number that would be committed in his or her absence. 
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for the calculation of the value of both specific deterrence and 
incapacitation. 
Many of the variables discussed below are likely to vary (in some cases 
substantially) depending on different factors, such as type of crime, severity 
of crime, offender age, geographic location, and others. The empirical 
literature on the economics of crime is in its infancy, and thus, in most cases, 
it is unknown how much each one of these characteristics affects the 
parameters. When possible, I will use data that shows variation along some of 
these dimensions. For example, I will use the substantial variation in cost 
even within a particular category of crime depending on its severity. In 
addition, I will present the numerical results separately for different 
categories of crime. Thus, one may think about this framework as describing 
a representative crime within a category, e.g., a representative robbery or 
burglary.198 
1. Policy 1: Increase All Sentence Lengths by % 
An increase in sentence lengths will deter some people from 
committing crimes in the first place through general deterrence.199 We can 
calculate this crime-reduction benefit in dollars as200: 
̅ ∗  
Here ̅ is the cost of an average crime and the other variables are as 
defined above. An % increase in sentence lengths will reduce crime 
through general deterrence by .201 This will yield a total reduction of 
crime of ∗ , which has a total value (in dollars) of: 
̅ ∗  
One may use a somewhat similar calculation for the incapacitation 
benefit of an % increase in all sentence lengths202: 
̅ ∗  
 
 198. See supra Table 3 for a full list of crime categories considered. 
 199. Of course, x can also be negative if the policy change is a decrease in sentence lengths. 
I use positive changes in sentence lengths for expositional simplicity. 
 200. The benefit will come out negative since  is a negative number—it is a cost savings. 
For simplicity, I drop the signs on numbers when performing the calculations. 
 201. As used in the equations,  is a decimal. For example, a 25% increase in sentence 
lengths is equivalent to using  = 0.25 in the equations. 
 202. Note that mean sentence length is not in this equation. This is because I implicitly 
assume that the timing of crimes is random and, thus, that the prison population reflects the 
mean sentence length. An increase in average sentence length of % will result in an increased 
prison population of %. 
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Here, instead of an elasticity, I introduce , the number of additional 
crimes—above the replacement crime rate—a prisoner would be responsible 
for annually if released. The term  is simply the prisoner count. Thus, 
increasing all sentences by 	 % is the equivalent of increasing the prison 
population by ∗ .203 This will result in ∗  averted crimes, 
with an attendant cost savings of ̅ ∗ . 
The calculation for specific deterrence is a bit more complicated, since 
specific deterrence does not appear to have an impact for all sentence 
lengths, but only for relatively short sentence lengths: 
̅ ∗ ∗ ̅ ∗
	 	 .		
∗ ∗
#	 	 	 	 .		 .		 	
 
Here the subscript effective indicates the sentencing interval over which 
specific deterrence is effective;  is the amount the recidivism rate is 
reduced as the sentence length s increases within the effective interval; 
̅  is the mean sentence length in the effective interval, and thus 
∗ ̅  is the change in sentence length due to an % overall increase 
in sentences. For small ’s, ∗ ̅ ∗  yields a good approximation 
for the decrease in recidivism rate due to specific deterrence. The term 
 is the number of prisoners in the effective interval, so 
∗  denotes the number of crimes they would commit annually 
if not incarcerated. Multiplying this by the change in recidivism rate yields 
the expected total reduction in crime. Multiplying this by ̅ gives the benefit 
of this reduction in dollars. The net benefit will simply be the sum of the 
benefits of crime reduction by each of the three mechanisms.204 
The costs of increasing all sentences by % come primarily from 
increased expenditures for imprisonment, and are substantially easier to 
compute: 
∗  
 
 203. This will actually be something of an overestimate since life and death sentences 
cannot be increased. This should not have a huge impact on the results, as life sentences 
account for only 0.3% of all sentences handed down to felons annually. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL 
ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL 
TABLES 7 tbl.1.4 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. Of 
course, this translates to a larger percentage of the prison population, but it is still a small 
minority. See id. 
 204. There is one small caveat—at what time does each of the benefits accrue? For general 
deterrence it will be immediate, but for specific deterrence and incapacitation, it will not be 
until after the increased sentences are experienced (at a time after the change is made). For 
simplicity, I assume no discount rate throughout this Article. 
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Where  is the total expenditure on imprisonment and  is the 
value of freedom to a prisoner. 
2. Policy 2: Crime Reclassification 
One way states have dealt with prison overcrowding is by reclassifying 
some crimes so that they are no longer punishable by incarceration. The 
crimes most likely to be reclassified tend to be those that are lowest cost 
(e.g., possession of small amounts of drugs or low-value larcenies). One way 
to conceptualize a reclassification of some crimes is as a 100% decrease in 
sentence length, which could be seen as an application of the equations 
from the first policy change. When using that approach, however, it is 
important to note that the cost of the crimes committed by individuals that 
are now free due to non-incarceration is likely to be on the low end of the 
crime cost distribution. In other words, we must replace the mean cost ̅ in 
the equations above with a new quantity, , which represents the mean cost 
of only the low-end crimes. 
To be concrete, I consider the impact of reclassifying the least serious 
r% of crimes that were previously subject to incarceration so that they may 
now not result in incarceration. I assume that individuals know exactly which 
sentence they are subject to, and thus, the policy change only impacts 
individuals who commit the reclassified crimes. 
Unlike the first policy change, incarceration is assumed to decrease for 
this policy change, so crime changes will result in increased costs (since now 
sentences are lower and more potential criminals are on the streets). The 
cost due to general deterrence is: 
∗ ∗  
Where  indicates the mean cost of crime for the lowest r percent and 
 is the amount of crime attributable to the lowest r percent.205 
The specific deterrence effect will be: 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗  
where  is the mean sentence of the bottom r percent of sentences and 
 is the number of prisoners impacted by the crime reclassification.206 
This multiplied by the derivative of recidivism yields the change in 
 
 205. We can approximate  as ∗  if we assume that there is no correlation 
between cost per crime and quantity of crime committed. This is equivalent to the general 
deterrence equation for the first policy change where x is 1, since the sentence length is 
reduced to 0, or 100%. 
 206. I approximate this as ∗ , which is likely an overestimate. The true cost of 
specific deterrence is likely lower. 
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recidivism rate. Multiplying this by ∗  gives the total expected 
increase in crime, and taking the product of that with  gives the total 
cost.207 
The cost from reduced incapacitation is easiest to quantify: 
∗ ∗  
where  is the share of overall sentence length of the lowest r 
percent.208 
The benefit of this policy change will come from reduced costs of 
imprisonment (including value of freedom): 
∗  
3. Policy 3: Prisoner Release 
A one-time release of prisoners could be (and has been) implemented 
in multiple ways, including releasing: (a) those with the least time remaining 
on their sentences; (b) those who have committed the least serious crimes; 
or (c) the oldest or most ill inmates. The calculation for each type of release 
is similar; only the exact parameter values differ. I assume here a one-time 
release of N prisoners, which results in a mean sentence reduction of D days. 
The general deterrent effect depends on how potential offenders view 
the release. If it is truly seen as a one-time release, then it will have no 
impact on their expectation of future punishment and, thus, no cost due to 
decreased general deterrence. If potential criminals do think a prisoner 
release is likely to be repeated within their offending careers, then it will 
decrease their expected sentence length and should have a general 
deterrence cost. The magnitude will depend on their assessment of the 
likelihood of recurrence and the specific type of release. I assume that 
potential criminals do not update their expected sentence based on one-
time releases and, thus, that 0. 
As discussed in the Subpart on specific deterrence, there have been at 
least two studies of exactly such prisoner releases.209 These studies provide 
estimates for the cost of such releases by virtue of decreased specific 
deterrence which can be quantified as: 
 
 207. This requires two assumptions: (1) that sentence length corresponds to the same 
percentile of crime cost and (2) that the bottom r percent of sentences are all in the region 
where longer sentences specifically deter (i.e., that they are below the kink in Figure 4). If these 
assumptions do not hold, the cost due to decreased specific deterrence would likely be 
substantially lower. 
 208. This can be computed as ∗ 	 / . 
 209. See supra Part II.B. 
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365
∗ ∗  
where  is the cost per crime that will not be specifically deterred due to 
the shorter sentence. The parameter θ is used because the correct cost will 
likely be below the mean and vary depending on whether the prison release 
is policy (a), (b), or (c). This equation is an upper bound on specific 
deterrence costs, assuming that all released prisoners have short enough 
sentences that a somewhat longer sentence would have decreased crime 
upon release. With this assumption, ∗  will be the change in recidivism 
rate per released prisoner, and  multiplied by the quantity will be the 
total extra crimes. 
It is difficult to know precisely what part of the cost distribution is 
appropriate to use, but for all three scenarios it should certainly be below 
the mean. We can conservatively use the tenth or twenty-fifth percentile as 
the average cost per crime. 
The incapacitation effect is once again the easiest component to 
calculate. It is: 
365
 
which is simply the amount of time the released prisoners will now be free 
and capable of committing crimes. Again, the correct value of  is certainly 
below the median, and is likely very close to zero for the oldest released 
prisoners. 
The benefit from a prisoner release is due to the reduced prison 
expenditures and value of freedom lost, and may be expressed as: 
365
 
That is, the aggregate number of years these prisoners will not be 
incarcerated ( ) times the sum of the annual prison and value of 
freedom cost. I now use the best empirical estimates of these parameters as 
identified in Part II to perform the calculations described. 
B. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To this point, I have discussed the need for evaluating explicit policy 
changes using precise causal estimates of the primary mechanisms by which 
incarceration affects crime: general deterrence, specific deterrence, and 
incapacitation. I have just presented the analytical framework with which to 
perform the cost–benefit analysis and now am at the point of performing 
these calculations. 
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In this Subpart, I perform the cost–benefit analysis for each of the three 
policy changes. Since there are substantial differences across categories of 
crime, I do the analysis separately for each of six categories.210 Ideally, the 
analysis would also take other types of variation into account, such as region 
or criminal history. The data that would be necessary for an analysis of that 
specificity does not currently exist, but I am able to take prisoner age into 
account to some extent in the evaluation of the third policy. Whenever they 
exist, I use estimates that are specific to the crime category, such as 
offending rates and prison populations. When some parameters are not 
available by type of crime (for example, general deterrence), I use the 
overall mean.211 
Before beginning the cost–benefit calculations, it is first necessary to 
introduce a few additional values that will be necessary: crime levels and 
incarceration rates. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program (“UCR”) 
assembles crime data collected by the FBI from nearly 17,000 law-
enforcement agencies across the country.212 This is by far the most 
comprehensive picture of crime in the United States. Since a good deal of 
crime goes unreported to law enforcement, these numbers must be adjusted 
by the reporting rate. The National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”), 
produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”), collects data on crime 
victimization from a national sample of individuals and households.213 One 
of the data elements they collect is the fraction of crimes that were reported 
to the police. I use this data for 2010 and combine it with UCR data on 
reported crimes to get an estimate of the overall crime rate.214 Figures 7 and 
8 display how the reported crime rate has varied over the last fifty years. 
  
 
 210. See supra Table 3. 
 211. Doing the analysis separately by type of crime requires an additional simplifying 
assumption that criminals only commit crimes in a single category. This is clearly an 
oversimplification, but it is one that is worth making in order to gain some insight into the 
differential impact of incarceration policies by type of crime. 
 212. See Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 74. 
 213. TRUMAN, supra note 154. 
 214. NCVS also produces estimates of national crime levels based on its sampling. There is 
some concern that this may result in the undercounting of certain populations, including the 
homeless, individuals in institutions, and highly mobile populations. Id. at 6. The NCVS also 
only counts crimes against adults, which will also result in a lower number. Id. 
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FIGURE 7 
REPORTED VIOLENT CRIME RATES IN THE U.S., 1960–2009 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8 
REPORTED PROPERTY CRIME RATES IN THE U.S., 1960–2009  
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To get the incarcerated population for each type of crime, it is 
necessary to sum up the federal, state, and local jail populations.215 In 2010, 
the BJS reported prisoners by crime only for state prisons.216 I interpolated 
the values for jails in 2010 using the distribution of jail inmates by crime 
from 2002 (the last time it was reported) and adjusting for the overall jail 
population change.217 For federal prisons, I assumed the same distribution 
of types of crime as in state prison. Therefore, I added fifteen percent to 
each state prison total because that is the ratio of the total federal to state 
prison populations.218 
1. Policy 1: Increase All Sentence Lengths by x% 
The cost–benefit analysis will be strongly dependent on the cost of 
crime estimates. In light of the recent advances in the cost of crime 
literature, I present the analysis of Policy 1 using four different cost of crime 
estimates (Table 5). For these calculations, I set x = 10% for an overall 
sentence length increase of 10%. It is easy to tell the impact of a prison 
population decrease of 10% by simply changing the signs on all of the 
calculated values. For the main calculations, I use the parameter estimates 
derived from the research discussed above.219 
  
 
 215. In this Article, I make the simplifying assumption that incarceration in a jail, state 
prison, or federal prison has the same effects. I also do not account for varying levels of security 
in prisons. While these facilities indubitably have different impacts, current data availability 
does not allow me to measure it. 
 216. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010 (2011), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
 217. DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 2002 (2004), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf. 
 218. See GUERINO ET AL., supra note 216; TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/content/pub/pdf/jim10st.pdf. 
 219. I use an elasticity of 10% for general deterrence. I allow incapacitation to vary 
according to crime type by calculating it from the crime rate and prison population for each 
crime, using an elasticity of 15%. The specific deterrence effect is computed using the cutoffs 
described in Abrams. See Abrams, supra note 32. The cost of prison is estimated at $86 per day 
based on Vera and Pew. See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 5 
COST–BENEFIT CALCULATIONS: POLICY 1 
Crime Cost Data 
Source 
Rape Robbery Assault Burglary 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft 
Theft 
Roman 
(2012) 
Mean 
Total Benefit 781,756,000  5,682,578,000 6,736,787,000 564,125,000  543,907,000  2,327,476,000  
  Gen. Deter. 268,361,000  1,795,665,000 1,768,964,000 165,327,000  135,841,000  521,426,000  
  Spec. Deter. 23,721,000  179,590,000 229,532,000 18,426,000  18,854,000  83,446,000  
  Incapacitation 489,674,000  3,707,323,000 4,738,291,000 380,372,000  389,212,000  1,722,604,000  
Cost 296,847,000  920,182,000 888,280,000 723,666,000  135,837,000  395,932,000  
Net Benefit 484,909,000  4,762,396,000 5,848,507,000 (159,541,000) 408,070,000  1,931,544,000  
Net Benefit / 
Prisoner 
5897  18,683 23,768 (796)  10,844  17,611  
Roman 
(2012) 
Median 
Total Benefit 94,574,000  1,810,439,000 3,331,353,000 99,267,000  243,728,000  168,316,000  
Cost 296,847,000  920,182,000 888,280,000 723,666,000  135,837,000  395,932,000  
Net Benefit (202,273,000) 890,257,000 2,443,073,000 (624,399,000) 107,891,000  (227,616,000) 
Net Benefit / 
Prisoner 
(2460) 3492 9928 (3115) 2867  (2075) 
Cohen 
et al. 
(2004) 
Total Benefit 1,322,986,000  5,272,030,000 3,905,157,000 3,541,776,000  193,978,000  717,968,000  
Cost 296,847,000  920,182,000 888,280,000 723,666,000  135,837,000  395,932,000  
Net Benefit 1,026,139,000  4,351,848,000 3,016,877,000 2,818,110,000  58,141,000  322,036,000  
Net Benefit / 
Prisoner 
12,479  17,072 12,260 14,058  1545  2936  
Cohen 
(1988) 
Total Benefit 511,274,000  513,109,000 1,203,044,000 348,452,000  224,265,000  317,344,000  
Cost 296,847,000  920,182,000 888,280,000 723,666,000  135,837,000  395,932,000  
Net Benefit 214,427,000  (407,073,000) 314,764,000 (375,214,000) 88,428,000  (78,588,000) 
Net Benefit / 
Prisoner 
2608  (1597) 1279 (1872) 2350  (717) 
Note: This table reports results of a cost–benefit calculation of a 10% increase in all sentence lengths, 
based on 2010 values of crime and incarceration rates using four different sources for crime costs. All 
figures are in 2010 dollars. See text for additional detail. 
There are several points to note about Table 5. The costs and benefits 
are substantial, measuring in either the hundreds of millions or billions of 
dollars. In addition, a 10% increase in sentence length appears to have 
substantial net benefits for each of the crime categories except for burglary. 
This is due, in large part, to the substantial benefit of incapacitation, which 
is the largest benefit for each crime. General deterrence is important as well, 
but specific deterrence does not affect the results much. 
This is borne out by a sensitivity analysis I performed (not reported in 
the tables) where I modified several of the parameter values. Modifying the 
parameters used for values of freedom, general deterrence elasticity, specific 
deterrence parameters, and cost of prison did not change the results 
significantly. The only reasonable parameter change that was significant was 
the incapacitation elasticity. When it was allowed to exceed 21%, all crime 
categories, including burglary, benefited from the longer sentences. 
When using the median costs of crime, as presented in Roman’s 2012 
article, the policy change produces increased net costs for theft and rape, in 
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addition to burglary.220 This is unsurprising because the median cost is lower 
than the mean for all crime categories, and thus, the reduction in crime 
from the increased sentence length is worth less. Now, even when 
performing a sensitivity analysis, the direction of the net benefit remains the 
same for all crime categories. 
Cohen, Miller, and Rossman’s 2004 article, which uses the contingent 
valuation method, has the higher crime costs for several categories.221 This 
naturally makes longer sentences appear more cost effective as can be seen 
in the third section of Table 5, where the benefits outweigh the costs for all 
crime categories. Choosing a very low incapacitation elasticity (less than 
0.05) causes a slight net loss for theft and motor vehicle theft, but all other 
categories retain a strong net benefit. 
Finally, the cost–benefit analysis of Policy 1 using the crime costs from 
Cohen’s 1988 article shows a net benefit for burglary, motor vehicle theft, 
and rape.222 This cost–benefit calculation is also sensitive only to the 
elasticity of incapacitation. If it is set to 0.05, the policy yields net losses for 
all of the crime categories (although the losses are small). Taken together, it 
appears that the cost–benefit calculations for Policy 1 are somewhat sensitive 
to both the cost of crime values and the incapacitation elasticity. I discuss 
this further in Part IV. 
It is important to note that while the figures in Table 5 are quite large, 
part of the reason they are so substantial (several times larger than the 
values in Table 6) is the huge number of affected prisoners. A 10% increase 
in all sentence lengths is the equivalent of adding over 200,000 prisoners 
nationwide. Thus, for comparison with Table 6, it is informative to look at 
the net benefit per prisoner. These numbers are still not directly 
comparable to those from the other policy changes, but they give the reader 
a better idea of the impact. 
2. Policy 2: Crime Reclassification 
For the cost–benefit calculation of Policy 2, I assume that the least costly 
10% of crimes in each category are reclassified so that they are no longer 
subject to incarceration. This change will increase crime rates, but decrease 
costs of incarceration. The results of this cost–benefit analysis and that for 
Policy 3 are reported in Table 6.223 One of the most significant differences 
from the Policy 1 analysis is that the costs of crime are substantially lower 
because the released individuals commit fewer and less costly crimes. This 
 
 220. See Roman, supra note 153, at 57–59. 
 221. See Cohen, Rust, Steen & Tidd, supra note 151, at 103. 
 222. See Cohen, supra note 139. 
 223. The analysis cannot be performed for theft because Roman does not report the full 
distribution of the cost of this crime. 
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effect is evident for all of the mechanisms because the magnitude of the 
impact on crime is substantially lower, in general, than in the first policy. 
The net effect of Policy 2 is positive for each crime except for robbery. 
This is due largely to the substantial savings on incarceration costs. The 
benefit-to-cost ratio is greatest for property crimes, where the increase in 
expected costs of crime is under $1 million in each case. In fact, the cost of 
the bottom decile of theft is so low that it is not estimated in Roman’s 2012 
article,224 and therefore I am unable to calculate the exact level of expected 
benefit. 
Robbery is the one crime for which the cost–benefit analysis implies 
that more inclusive penalties might be optimal. This is due in large part to 
the fact that most robberies are quite costly, even at the low end of the 
distribution. 
TABLE 6 
COST–BENEFIT CALCULATIONS: POLICIES 2 & 3 
Policy Rape Robbery Assault Burglary 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft 
Theft 
Crime 
Reclassification 
Benefit  25,813,000   42,604,000 59,071,000  56,880,000  12,905,000   22,885,000  
Total Cost  1,976,000   68,229,000  3,511,000  153,000  162,000                    -    
   Gen. Deter.  1,160,000   48,814,000  1,523,000  29,000  18,000                     -    
   Spec. Deter.  436,000   7,786,000  559,000  30,000  27,000                     -    
   Incapacitation  380,000   11,629,000  1,429,000  94,000  117,000                     -    
Net Benefit  23,837,000  (25,625,000) 55,560,000  56,727,000  12,743,000   22,885,000  
Net Benefit / 
Prisoner 
 2899   (1005)  2258  2830  3386   2087  
One-Time 
Prisoner 
Release 
Benefit  5,934,000   5,934,000  5,934,000  5,934,000  5,934,000   5,934,000  
Total Cost  95,900   1,781,700  157,900  10,900  59,200  -    
   Gen. Deter.  -    -    -  -   -     -    
   Spec. Deter.  8700   162,000  14,400  1000  5400                     -    
   Incapacitation   87,200   1,619,700  143,500  9900  53,800                     -    
Net Benefit  5,838,100   4,152,300  5,776,100  5,923,100  5,874,800   5,934,000  
Annualized Net 
Benefit / Release 
 35,515   25,260  35,138  36,032  35,738   36,099  
Note: This table reports results of a cost–benefit calculation under two different incarceration policy 
changes, based on 2010 values of crime and incarceration rates, using Roman (2012) for crime costs. The 
crime reclassification assumes 10% of crimes in each category become not subject to incarceration. The 
one-time prisoner release assumes a release of 1000 prisoners in the bottom decile of crime cost with an 
average remaining sentence of 60 days. All figures are in 2010 dollars. See text for additional detail. 
The results displayed in Table 6 are fairly stable with respect to changes 
in various parameter values. When using a substantially lower cost for the 
tenth-percentile robbery, as suggested by Cohen’s 1988 article,225 the 
resulting cost–benefit analysis parallels the rest of the crime categories: some 
 
 224. Roman, supra note 153. 
 225. Cohen, supra note 139, at 546. 
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reduction in penalties would be beneficial. Other parameter changes have 
little impact on the results. The per-prisoner values are generally in the low 
thousands of dollars. Given that a number of states have tens of thousands of 
prisoners, this translates to millions of dollars of potential savings and little 
expected increase in crime. This is true for all crimes examined except 
robbery, where expanding the number of offenders eligible for 
incarceration would maximize the net benefits. 
3. Policy 3: Prisoner Release 
The results of the cost–benefit calculation for the final policy change 
are reported in Table 6. This policy calls for the one-time release of a certain 
set of prisoners. For the calculation, I assume that 1000 prisoners are 
released early, leading to an average sentence reduction of sixty days. The 
prisoners could be chosen based on age, health, severity of crime, time left 
on sentence, or other criteria. Regardless of how they are chosen, the 
prisoners released will certainly offend far less than average and commit less 
costly crimes. I assume that both the cost of crime and offending rates will 
be in the tenth percentile. 
The cost–benefit analysis shows that this policy results in a substantial 
net benefit for all crimes. The costs of decreased specific deterrence and 
incapacitation are small. This is due in large part to the fact that the extra 
crimes the released prisoners commit will likely not be very costly. 
The most significant effect here is simply from the savings in prison 
costs. Even a reduction in a relatively small number of inmates (less than 
one percent of the California state prison population) for two months saves 
millions of dollars. This overwhelms the small increase in crime costs and 
leads to a substantially positive net benefit as well as a large benefit-to-cost 
ratio for each crime. Even when using a higher cost of crime or larger 
elasticities, the net benefits of this policy change are still large and positive 
for all crimes. 
The savings per release are over $20,000 per year for each of the crime 
categories, an impressive figure that is substantially larger than the savings 
found for Policy 2. There is one caveat, however. This policy is not very 
scalable: the cost–benefit analysis is only applicable if the released offenders 
are some of the least frequent offenders and commit low cost crimes. The 
number of prisoners that could be released under this policy, with gains of 
this magnitude, depends on the specific policies that determine who is 
released. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
I have argued in this Article that cost–benefit analysis is the most 
effective way to inform policy decisions. There are several important points 
that are clear from the calculations above. Of the policies examined, the 
one-time prisoner release appears to be by far the most cost-effective 
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approach. This is almost entirely due to the fact that prisoner releases tend 
to pick out just those inmates who are least likely to cause substantial harm. 
They may be chosen due to the severity of offense, age, health, or remaining 
sentence length, all characteristics which predict low crime costs. Of course, 
the accuracy of the cost–benefit calculation for one-time releases depends in 
part on the selection of these low cost inmates. It also depends partially on 
the assumption that one-time releases do not cause a reduction in general 
deterrence, because would-be offenders understand that they will be 
unaffected. This assumption seems like a good one, since a search of the 
literature revealed only one example of a state with repeat prisoner releases 
in the past forty years (Alabama).226 
The fact that prisoner release is cost effective across all crime categories 
examined may be somewhat surprising, given the large divergence in costs 
and offending rates by category. This is due to the fact that in categories 
with more costly crimes offending rates are frequently lower. But more to 
the point this reemphasizes the importance of using the cost of the actual 
crimes that would be committed by released prisoners, which will be well 
below the average. 
Given these findings, what is a policymaker to do? Is prisoner release 
the solution to any budgetary or overcrowding problems? By its nature, one-
time releases cannot be repeated, or they will begin to erode general 
deterrence and thus increase crime more substantially. For a state that has 
not had a substantial prisoner release in a couple of decades (an average 
offending career) this is the most cost-effective choice. 
But policymakers looking for long-run improvements in the effective 
use of incarceration should also consider the second policy option, 
reclassification of some crimes. The results of this analysis show that net 
benefits increase for most crimes, including all property crimes, when the 
lowest level offenses do not lead to incarceration. Simply put, incarcerating 
someone for stealing a $1000 laptop is not very cost-effective. The opposite 
is true for robbery, however, where the cost–benefit analysis indicates that a 
broadening of the definition of robberies that are penalized by 
incarceration would be preferable. 
California has already begun implementing just such law changes, 
including raising the threshold value for felony larceny. In addition, small 
violations of parole, such as missing a drug test or failing to update an 
address after a move, no longer trigger automatic incarceration. For 
property crimes, these changes appear to be cost-effective, and something 
that other states should consider emulating. 
In comparison to prior cost–benefit research on incarceration, this 
Article adds a great deal of precision due to the concrete policy changes 
 
 226. Rawls, supra note 26. 
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considered, the focus on precisely estimated parameters in the cost–benefit 
analysis, and the separate analysis by crime category. John Donohue looked 
at the average cost of crime and found that the cost–benefit calculation 
could suggest an increase or decrease in incarceration depending on the 
parameter values.227 Owens’ findings mostly go in the opposite direction as 
those found here.228 She suggests that greater incarceration for young 
offenders may be beneficial.229 The fact that she has relatively large 
uncertainty and that she focuses only on youthful offenders (who have the 
highest offending rates) means that her results may still be compatible with 
this Article. 
Earlier cost–benefit calculations by Levitt did incorporate variation in 
costs according to the type of crime.230 However the uncertainties in his 
estimates led him to conclude only that the costs and benefits of crime are 
around the same order of magnitude. DiIulio and Piehl wrote in response to 
a 1987 National Institute of Justice report by Edwin W. Zedlewski that found 
the benefits of incarceration outweighed the costs by a factor of ten.231 
DiIulio and Piehl suggest that Zedlewski’s result is substantially off. They 
find that the benefits outweigh the costs for the median cost criminal (across 
all crimes) but that the reverse is true for lower percentiles.232 This is entirely 
consistent with the results of this study. 
I have included the value of lost freedom as one of the components of 
the cost of incarceration for a few reasons. First, it includes much more than 
just a prisoner’s foregone rights, but also includes foregone wages and the 
impact on loved ones. Second, a cost–benefit analysis generally includes the 
net effects on all individuals, even if they commit crimes. But importantly, 
the magnitude of the value of freedom is small and, as was seen in the 
previous Part, does not impact the direction of the findings. Thus, if one 
believes this cost should be eliminated from the calculations, the results 
would be largely unchanged. 
The biggest growth in incarceration in the last two decades has been in 
drug crimes, a category that is not covered in this analysis due to the fact 
 
 227. Donohue, supra note 152, at 305. 
 228. See Owens, supra note 132. 
 229. Id. at 572. 
 230. Levitt, supra note 12. 
 231. EDWIN W. ZEDLEWSKI, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MAKING CONFINEMENT DECISIONS 1 
(1987), available at http://www.d.umn.edu/~jmaahs/Correctional%20Assessment/Articles/ 
prison%20pays%20articles.pdf; DiIulio & Piehl, supra note 152; see also Anne Morrison Piehl & 
John J. DiIulio, Jr., “Does Prison Pay?” Revisited: Returning to the Crime Scene, BROOKINGS REV., 
Winter 1995. 
 232. DiIulio & Piehl, supra note 152, at 33–34 & tbl.5. 
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that these cost estimates are virtually non-existent.233 Given the widely 
divergent views that exist on the utility of many penalties for drugs, this is an 
area of particular interest for future work. Incorporating cost estimates for 
drug crimes and better estimates of incapacitation effects are the two 
advances that will most improve future analyses of the costs and benefits of 
incarceration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The question of how best to deter unlawful behavior has existed for as 
long as societies have been governed by laws. This Article shows how it is 
possible to reduce crime by using incarceration in a more cost-effective 
manner. The cost–benefit analysis performed here breaks new ground in 
several ways. I use new, more accurate causal estimates of general 
deterrence, specific deterrence, and incapacitation. I also use new estimates 
of the cost of crime, which account for the enormous variation in the 
damage crime inflicts, even within a single category. This enables me to 
evaluate policy changes in a realistic way. I am also able to perform the 
analysis for specific types of crime, rather than aggregating all crimes 
together, which allows for more realistic possibilities of increased penalties 
for some crimes and decreased penalties for others. 
The results of the cost–benefit analysis are striking. The benefits of one-
time prisoner releases greatly outweigh the costs for all crime categories 
considered. For all crime categories, except robbery, reducing the scope of 
crimes subject to incarceration yields a net benefit as well. For robberies, my 
calculations show that the opposite is true: their costs are high enough that a 
greater rate of incarceration for these crimes is warranted. 
The goal of the cost–benefit analysis is to use concrete numbers to help 
make better-informed decisions about the use of imprisonment. In so doing, 
this study complements and extends the traditional legal literature which 
focuses largely on history and theory, but generally has no good way to trade 
off countervailing effects, like the desire for low crime as well as low 
spending. 
For example, William Stuntz’s excellent new book, The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice, focuses on the historical and ethical origins of our 
criminal justice system, as well as current problems.234 Frank Zimring’s The 
City That Became Safe takes a more quantitative look at recent crime trends in 
the United States, with a particular focus on the large declines in crime in 
 
 233. Cohen and Piquero and others have attempted to calculate long-term costs of drug 
usage, but these studies do not provide the level of specificity necessary to perform a cost–
benefit analysis. See Cohen & Piquero, supra note 145, at 47. 
 234. STUNTZ, supra note 10. 
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New York City in the late 1990s and 2000s.235 Zimring’s work helpfully 
identifies trends and correlations, but it does not take advantage of the 
recent developments in economic methodology necessary to make precise 
policy recommendations. Stephanos Bibas, in the incredibly creative book, 
The Machinery of Criminal Justice, focuses on some of the aspects of criminal 
justice that are less amenable to the sort of analysis employed in this 
Article.236 Incarceration policy should certainly be premised at least in part 
on the preferences of the populace, but the goal of this Article is to better 
inform policymakers about those components that can be captured with a 
cost–benefit approach. 
This work has immediate, practical implications. Many states are dealing 
with budgetary crises that have forced reductions in vital expenditures. 
Reductions in spending on incarceration, if implemented correctly, can ease 
budgetary pressures without significantly increasing the costs of crime. 
California can use these recommendations as a guide to responding to the 
prison-population requirement of Brown v. Plata.237 
As available data improves, policy decisions should rely on this type of 
analysis whether or not there are severe economic pressures. Overspending 
on incarceration is wasteful both in terms of lost productivity of inmates and 
the additional burden on taxpayers, and underspending (as in the category 
of robberies) can be dangerous. Further research will make such cost–
benefit calculations even more useful. More studies that estimate crime 
costs, elasticities, prison costs, and other parameters for different regions, 
age groups, and types of crime are needed. Going forward, the cost–benefit 
approach should be expanded to other areas of criminal justice, including 
policing, alternate sanctions, and prisoner reentry programs. The era of a 
scientific approach to criminal justice policy is beginning. 
 
 235. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE (2011). 
 236. BIBAS, supra note 11. 
 237. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
